Economic survey of Latin America, 1980 by NU. CEPAL
E G O M O M O C 
A N D 
S O G O Â L G O U M G O L 
GENERAL 
» E/CEPAL/G.l 153 
^ 30 April 1981 
ENGLISH 
ORIGINAL: SPANISH 
C E P A L 
Economic Commission for Latin America 
Nineteenth Session 
Montevideo, Uruguay, 4-16 May 1981 
ECONOMIC SURVEY 
OF LATIN AMERICA 
1980 
P R E L I M I N A R S U M M A R Y 
8 1 - 4 - 7 1 0 

I. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING 
Before examining the economic situation in Latin America in 1980 it is desirable in order to provide a 
global framework for the subsequent analysis, to review briefly world economic trends during that 
year. The review will cover trends in economic growth, inflation, international trade and external 
financing in the industrialized countries, the centrally planned economies and the oil-exporting and 
non-oil-exporting developing countries. 
Since the mid-1970s the world economy has evidenced a marked slowdown from the unprece-
dented growth and prosperity that was enjoyed in the two decades following World War II. While it is 
uncertain whether the downturn is due to cyclical or structural factors and whether it is of a 
temporary or permanent nature, it is nevertheless evident that the slowdown is more prolonged and 
severe than might have been expected by many when the open manifestation of world-wide problems 
first appeared in late 1973. Moreover, as will become clear from the ensuing analysis, events in 
1979-1980 represent a second major setback for a world economy that had been displaying some 
signs of successful adjustment to the all too well-known economic shocks of 1973-1974. 
1. Output 
In 1980 the growth of world output slipped to only 2.2%, which is considerably below the growth 
rate of 3.8% achieved in 1979 and less than half of the recovery rate of 4.7% recorded in 1976-1978. 
Moreover, the slowdown was all-pervasive, as every major country group suffered a serious loss of 
dynamism in economic activity (see table 1). The most severe reduction in output growth was in the 
developed market economies (which basically represent the OECD area), as their joint Gross 
Domestic Product rose by only 1.5%, in contrast with nearly 4% the year before. The centrally 
planned economies also experienced a slippage in their growth rates with respect to the modest 
expansion of 1979. As for the developing countries, they suffered a serious setback to their growth 
aspirations, with output expanding by mearly 1% less than the already modest rate of 4.8% recorded 
in 1979; indeed, growth was only slightly higher than that recorded in the deep recession of 1975. 
The gravity of the world recession in 1980 can perhaps be better appreciated by viewing the 
data on world industrial production in table 2. Here it is seen that the volume of world industrial 
output grew by only 1.5% in 1980, the second worst performance of the decade (in 1975 output 
underwent an absolute decline). It can also be seen that in this same year (1980) the growth of 
industrial output in the developed market economies was virtually nil, while the expansion in the 
developing countries was a disappointing 1.8%. In 1975, when world industrial production plum-
meted in absolute terms, the centrally planned economies managed to insulate themselves from 
overall trends; this was clearly not the case in 1980, however, as the expansion of their industrial 
output was considerably less than half that of 1973-1974. 
Turning to a slightly more detailed examination of the economic blocs, it is seen that the 
downturn in the OECD area was generalized, but not as severe as that which was experienced in 
1974-1975 (see table 3). The worst performances were those of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, where output declined in absolute terms. The primary factor underlying these events was a 
roughly 140% increase in the average price of petroleum1 in 1979-1980 that eroded the area's terms 
of trade and reduced income by an estimated 2.2%.2 Slower growth of personal incomes adversely 
affected residential investment, which was also severely hurt by tight monetary policies introducing 
extraordinarily high domestic interest rates in many OECD countries (see table 4). Furthermore, 
fiscal restraint has become a watchword in many countries and thus trends in government conSump-
'"The annual average official price of OPEC crude rose from 12.93 dollars in 1978 to 30.87 dollars in 1980. 
The bulk of the price rise took place in 1979, with the price stabilizing at around 32 dollars by mid-1980. 
2See OECD, Economic Outlook No. 28, December 1980, p. 13. 
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tion introduced a procyclical contractionary effect. Non-residential investment also sagged in this 
depressed environment, but it is important to note that it did not collapse,¡as was the case in 1975, 
apparently due to the fact that investors were somewhat better conditioned to withstand the 
upheavals brought about by changing world oil prices. 
Growth of the material product in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries is 
estimated to have been about 2.9% in 1980: slightly higher than the low rate of 2.5% recorded in 
1979, but well below the average expansion of 6.3% achieved in 1971-1975. The Soviet Union 
-bolstered by favourable terms of trade, due in part to its petroleum exports- was actually able to 
significantly expand/real output in 1980. This was not the case for the Eastern European countries, 
however, which generally encountered difficult situations with regard to external balances that 
necessitated a tight rein on economic activity (in the case of Hungary and Poland, output declined in 
absolute 'terms). It should also be aclded that the economic performance of this group of countries 
was handicapped for the second consecutive year by poor agricultural output: it is estimated thit 
production declined by 3% in 1980, fo'lowing a 2% drop in 1979. 
In China there was a slowing down of production in industry and agriculture from a growth rate 
of more than 6% in 1979 to something less than 5% in 1980. Poor harvests were a major factor 
behind this performance, but there was also a noticeable slackening in the rate of growth of heavy 
industry. 
It is evident that in 1980 the developing countries were unable to insulate themselves from the 
world recession as some of them did in 1975; as may be seen from table 5, only Southand East Asian 
countries were able to accelerate growth with respect to 1979.. 
Countries that are net exporters of petroleum saw their growth rates slip from 5.5% in 1979 to 
4% in 1980. A primary factor behind the less dynamic performance was the reduced petroleum 
production that was induced by the recession in the OECD and mild winter weather in the northern 
hemisphere. 
The Iran-Iraq war was an additional factor. But it should also be mentioned that a number of oil 
producers have been deliberately aiming at more moderate growth rates in order to minimize the 
social and economic disturbances that can be associated with rapid growth; moreover, some countries 
are focussing their projects on social development which in the near term tends to produce less 
dramatic rates of economic expansion. 
In 1980 growth sagged further for the net importers of energy (see again table 5) on account of 
adverse terms of trade and less favourable conditions for securing finance to support high growth 
rates. Some large countries such as Brazil and India were able to accelerate their growth rates in 1980 
partly on account of sharp recoveries in agricultural production, but while some other countries also 
enjoyed better harvests, on a per capita basis there was no gain in agricultural output for this group of 
countries.3 
2. Prices 
Serious inflationary pressures continued to plague the world economy even in the face of a sharp 
economic slowdown in all geographic areas. 
In the OECD area, prices rose, on an annual average basis, by 12.5% in 1980, which is a marked 
increase over the 9.8% rate of 1979 and roughly four times the rate of increase in prices that was 
recorded in the 1960s (see table 6). Among the major OECD countries, there was a uniform 
worsening of the inflationary situation: Japan saw its rate of inflation more than double in 1980, and 
that of the United Kingdom increased by more than a third, while the United States, which has 
traditionally enjoyed one of the most stable price structures in the world, had the 11 th worst rate of 
inflation in the 24-nation OECD group. 
Not surprisingly, one of the major elements behind the deterioration in price performance was 
adjustment to higher energy costs, but higher food prices also contributed to the inflationary spiral. It 
is noteworthy that wages were not a major inflationary factor, as wage demands have been 
3 See GATT, Press Release, 10 March 1981, p. 7. 
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surprisingly restrained since 1978.4 It is also interesting to note that some of the worst inflationary 
performances were in countries with significantly appreciating exchange rates (see table 7), which 
would be consistent with the notion that domestic prices tend to be rigid downwards. 
An interesting point is that for the first time in recent years inflation has also become a 
problem in some centrally planned economies. While in most of them official prices moved very little, 
this was accomplished only by official intervention in markets and growing fiscal subsidies. In other 
countries that have tended to rely somewhat more on market forces, e.g. Poland, Hungary ar.d China, 
necessary price adjustments have been rather severe, i.e., 1% to 9% annually. 
As for the developing countries, the economic shocks of 1979-1980 occurred when many 
countries were already grappling with serious internal stabilization problems, and events in these years 
only served to aggravate the situation. In 1980 inflation showed serious acceleration in all regional 
groups, although the countries of South and East Asia continued to stand out by their remarkably 
moderate rates of inflation as compared to other developing areas (see table 8). 
The very high level of inflation in the developing countries is sufficient evidence of the 
domestic factors underlying inflationary pressures. However, the internal rate of price increases has 
also undoubtedly been affected by external events such as higher import prices for key goods, e.g., 
energy and manufactured items, and devaluations brought on by weakening external balances. 
Another significant factor has been "adjustment" inflation stemming from the fact that many 
developing countries are eliminating subsidies, freeing interest rates, etc., in order to achieve a more 
efficient allocation of resources in their domestic economies. 
3. Trade 
GATT has estimated that world merchandise trade reached nearly 2 000 billion dollars in 1980: an 
increase of 20%, compared to a rise o f 25% in 1979. Moreover, almost all the rise was due to price 
increases, as volume was sluggish and rose by only 1%, one of the lowest rates of increase in 
the last 25 years and in sharp contrast with the 6% rise recorded in 1979. The less dynamic trade 
performance reflected a sharp absolute decline in the volume of petroleum exports and a fall in the 
growth rate of world trade in manufactures, from 5.5% in 1979 to roughly 3% in 1980. Growth of 
the volume o f agricultural trade also decelerated to 4% from the 7% rate of expansion of 1980. If 
petroleum is excluded from consideration, world trade volume expanded by 4% in 1980. s 
In the developed market economies, the value of exports and imports rose by 17% and 19%, 
respectively (see table 9). The growth of imports was due entirely to higher prices, as volume declined 
by nearly 2%, compared to an 8% rise in the previous year. Export growth also mostly reflected price 
trends, as the volume rose by only slightly more than 3%, compared with 6.5% in 1979. The 
deterioration in the terms of trade in 1980 was roughly 8%. 
If one examines the OECD area, it becomes evident that the developing countries' imports 
played a significant role in helping to sustain overall growth rates. In 1980 the volume of OECD 
exports to OPEC countries rose by 20%, and exports to the non-oil developing countries grew by 4%; 
both rates exceeded those recorded for intra-OECD trade.6 GATT, focussing on trade in manufac-
tured goods, has noted that in 1980 the oil exporters accounted for nearly 10% of the industrialized 
countries' exports, a new peak. On a net basis, the surplus on the trade in manufactured goods with 
the oil exporters was 82 billion dollars in 1980, 33% greater than the previous year. While it is 
estimated that the value of trade in manufactures between the industrialized countries and the non-oil 
developing countries slowed down somewhat from the 25% rate of growth recorded in 1979, trade 
flows with these countries continued to be the fastest growing ones for the industrialized countries.7 
4 OECD, op. cit., pp. 40-4 X 
5 See GATT, op. cit., p. 1. 
6See OECD, op. cit., p. 55. 
7See GATT, op. cit., p. 11. 
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Within the centrally planned economies, trade performances varied considerably. The Eastern 
European countries, concerned about their external indebtedness with international commercial 
banks, pushed export volume up by roughly 3%, while completely containing the real growth of their 
imports. The Soviet Union however, as a net exporter of petroleum, enjoyed favourable terms of 
trade and was able to expand its import volume by about 5%, while exports rose in volume by only a 
little over 1%. China, for its part- was able to reduce its trade deficit largely by severe restrictions on 
imports. 
The oil-expor:ing developing countries' exports rose by 42% in value in 1980 entirely on the 
basis of rising world petroleum prices; since the volume of exports declined quite sharply by an 
amount estimated at nearly 13%. The lower volume, of course, reflected the effects of sluggish world 
economic activity and general effor s to conserve energy. Unlike 1979, when import volume tended 
to stagnate, in 1980 t iese countries' imports showed renewed and vigorous growth; they rose by 30% 
in value, compared to 7% in 1979, while volume was up by arour.d 15%. As alnady noted, the 
imports of the oil exporters in 1980 were an important factor in the trade performance of the 
industrialized countries, but a considerable amount of these imports also come from non-oil 
developing countries and were a significant factor in this latter group's efforts to sustain their export 
drive. 
•The non-oil developing countries expanded the value of their exports by almost a quarter in 
1980, while their imports rose by nearly 30% (see again table 9). Export earnings were pushed up 
basically by higher prices, as volume expanded by only 3%. Prices for the primary commodities 
(excluding petroleum) of the developing countries displayed considerable dynamism in 1980 (see 
table 10), and it is estimated that for the year as a whole the rise in these prices was 17%, which 
compares favourably with the 12% increase in the price of manufactured goods exported by the 
developed countries.8 Of course, the actual impact of the prices depends on the commodity 
composition of exports: for instance, sugar exporters enjoyed a dramatic increase of over 150% in 
prices (due to production shortfalls in Cuba and the USSR), while coffee producers saw their export 
prices slacken in 1980. In any event, when petroleum imports are taken into account the non-oil-
exporting developing countries suffered a serious deterioration of their terms of trade, leading to a 
46% increase in this group's trade deficit in 1980 (see again table 9). 
4. Current account balances and finance 
It is clear from table 11 that the world economy suffered another major upheaval in current account 
balances and financial requirements in 1979-1980. Once again rising oil prices thrust the oil exporters 
into a very large current account surplus - w h i c h in real terms was nearly equivalent to the 1974 peak 
surplus— while the other major economic groups fell into serious deficit positions. 
In some ways the current situation represents an improvement over 1974; for instance, in 1980 
the industrialized countries (e.g., Germany and Japan) were assuming a relatively large share of the 
deficits, which could be deemed appropriate because they have the greatest capacity to finance them. 
Also on the positive side, the oil price shock apparently did not erode investors' confidence as much 
as was the case in 1974. 
On the negative side, however, is the concern over the possibility that the oil producers may be 
much slower in shedding their surpluses than they were during 1974-1978, in part because of an 
awareness that uncontrolled imports and growth can have undesirable political and social conse-
quences. Meanwhile, the non-oil developing countries have had to face a massive rise in the cost of 
energy at a time when many still have not fully recovered from the internal and external imbalances 
created by the events of 1974. Moreover, the situation of the oil-importing developing countries has 
been made more precarious by the fact that prolonged stagflation in the industrialized countries is 
putting increasing pressure on declining industries in the North and is generating new demands for 
protectionism. On the finance side there is the spectre of possible difficulties because commercial 
8See GATT, op. cit., p. 4. 
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banks - t h e chief financiers of the developing countries' deficits in 1974-1978- are already very 
exposed in the heavily indebted Third World and are showing signs of reluctance to assume major 
responsibility in this, the second round of the recycling process.9 But perhaps the most distressing 
problem of all is that after more than six years of stagflation there appear: to be few new ideas on how 
problems should be confronted for the purpose of restoring growth and prosperity to the world 
economy. 
Notwithstanding the worsening of the deficit situation of the developing countries' external 
accounts, preliminary evidence suggests that there was a decline in borrowing from private inter-
national capital markets for the first time in a number of years (see tables 12 and 13).1 0 This can be 
attributed to factors on both the supply and demand sides. 
On the supply tide, as already mentioned, commercial bankers aj pear to have become reluctait 
to fully :ommit themselves to a nev round of marsive lending to devf íoping countrks and as a result 
they are apparently being more cautous and selective in extending le ans. With regard to the demand 
side, many developing countries preferred to avoid the market in 1980 because lending conditions 
had become rather onerous. While spreads on eurocurrency credits - b y far the most important source 
of funding- remained low in comparison with the crisis period of 1975-1976 (see table 14), the base 
interest rate (LIBOR), which is the most important determinant of interest cost, reached record levels 
during 1980, averaging 14.2% as compared to 12.0% in 1979 and 9.4% and 6.4% in 1978 and 1977, 
respectively.11 There was also a noticeable tightening of maturity structures in 1980 (see table 15). 
In view of market conditions, many countries opted to finance their needs through greater 
deployment of international reserves, which had been accumulated in considerable amounts in earlier 
periods when the terms of credit were more attractive, and more use was made of official finance: for 
example, new IMF commitments to non-oil developing countries for balance of payments assistance 
rose from only 2.2 billion dollars in 1979 to 7.2 billion dollars in 1980.12 
The trend towards more official finance appears to be part of a healthy adjustment in the 
structure of world financial flows. During the 1970s, commercial banks - fue l led as they were by 
deposits from the large surpluses of the oil-producing countries- greatly expanded their lending to 
LDCs and as a consequence they were able to dwarf the activities of official lenders such as the IMF 
and World Bank. However, commercial bank lending has tended to be concentrated in the gjoup of 
uppei-income developing countries such as those in Latín America, and it would be unreasonable to 
expect, the growth of lending to these countries to exceed the growth rate of the banks' capital base 
for an indefinite period.13 
Thus, new lending from official institutions would seem to be an appropriate and timely way to 
restore some balance to international capital flows to developing countries, as well as to improve their 
maturity structure; furthermore, it would relieve some of the pressure on the banks and also provide 
for a more deliberate and co-ordinated international adjustment process. For this to happen, however, 
9The commercial banks apparently feel that their capacity to maintain the vigorous rates of growth of 
lending that the world has become accustomed to will be constrained by prudential concerns and the limiting forces 
of capital/asset ratios. For an excellent discussion of this issue see Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, World 
Financial Markets, September 1980. 
1 0 Aside from the fact that data for 1980 are still of a very preliminary nature, the estimates for 1980 
probably overstate the fall in borrowing because in this year there appears to have been more recourse to 
unpublicized borrowing and individual as opposed to large syndicated credits. 
1 1 Rate for 6-month Eurodollars calculated from data in various issues of Morgan Guaranty's World Financial 
Markets. 
1 2 See IMF Survey, February 9, 1981, pp. 38-39. 
1 3 After 1975 United States banks began to slow down their lending to LDCs, but even so, it has grown at a 
rate of 17% per annun in face of a 13% per annum expansion of the capital base. Meanwhile, over the same period 
non-United States banks have been expanding loans to these countries at a rate of 40%per annum, while the average 
capital base has risen at only 25%per annum. Sec Morgan Guaranty Trust, op. cit., September 1980, p. 8. 
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official institutions must be more successful in directly tapping the OPEC surplus, more than 50% of 
which found its way into commercial bank deposits in 1979-1980.1 4 In 1980, both the IMF and the 
World Bank made proposals to augment their resources via borrowing agreements with OPEC 
countries: the IMF has recently reached an agreement to borrow 8 billion SDRS from the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia over the next 2 years, with a tentative agreement for another 4 billion SDRS in 
the third year,15 while the World Bank is exploring support for a new energy affiliate which would 
imply additional resources of up to 12 billion dollars.16 
II. MAIN TRENDS 
The evolution of the Latin American economy in 1980, affected as it was by the adverse international 
situation, was clearly less favourable than in the previous year. Thus, the economic growth rate went 
down in most of the countries of the region, while balance-of-payments deficits increased, as did 
external indebtedness. At the same time, inflationary pressures persisted, so that the continued 
marked rises in price levels -hitherto characteristic only of a limited number of Latin American 
economies— came to form a generalized phenomenon in the region. 
Some of these features assume a somewhat different nature, however, if considered from a 
longer time perspective and, above all, if the tendencies prevailing in the world economy during 1980 
are taken into account. 
Thus, although the economic growth rate of 5.7% recorded by Latin America in 1980 was 
somewhat less than the 6% attained in 1979, it was not only the highest recorded in 1980 in any 
major region of the Third World, but was also markedly higher than the growth rates of production 
achieved in the same year in both the centrally planned economies (3.1%) and in the group of 
industrialized countries (1.5%) (see tables 1 and 5). The annual growth of nearly 6% in the product 
achieved by Latin America in the last two years, when recessive tendencies once again predominated 
in the world economy and the world oil prices underwent a second major series of rises, was also 
much more than the rate of a little over 3% recorded in 1975, the year when the previous crisis in the 
world economy came to an end (see table 16). 
Naturally, the maintenance of this relatively high economic growth rate contributed to the 
continued very rapid increase in the region's imports, and in turn this influenced the current account 
deficit of the balance of payments. This deficit was further increased by the enormous increase in 
interest payments due to the considerable rise in 1980 in interest rates in world financial markets and 
the rapid and persistent rise in the external debt of Latin America in the second half of the 1970s. 
Finally, in the case of the oil-importing countries the deficit on the external accounts was also 
affected by the big increase in the international prices of hydrocarbons. Thus, the current account 
deficit of this group of countries rose in 1980 to the unprecedented level of 23 700 million dollars: a 
figure two-thirds higher than that for the previous year and almost three times the deficit recorded in 
1978. Although at the regional level this extraordinary increase in the current account imbalance was 
mitigated by the reduction in the deficit of the oil-exporting countries, even so the balance-of-
payments current account deficit for Latin America as a whole in 1980 reached a historic peak of 
over 27 400 million dollars (see table 16). 
Furthermore, in contrast with previous years, the increase in the balance-of-payments current 
account deficit in 1980 was not accompanied by a larger net flow of capital, since the net inflow of 
financial resources into the region - 2 5 900 million dollars- was almost identical with that in 1979, 
thus interrupting the marked and almost continuous upward trend it had displayed during the 
1 4 See William J. Gasser, "The Global Payments Problems" Quarterly Review (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York), Winter 1980-1981, Vol. 5, NO 4, p. 32. 
1 5 IMF, Morning News, March 30, 1981. 
1 6 See World Bank, Energy in the Developing Countries, August 1980. 
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previous decade.17 Moreover, in contrast with what had happened in the period 1974-1979, the net 
capital received by Latin America in 1980 was not sufficient to cover the current account deficit, so 
that the region's balance-of-payments closed with a negative balance of a little over 1 500 million 
dollars, for the first time since 1962. 
Furthermore, in 1980 the region's external indebtedness continued to grow rapidly. Thus, it is 
estimated that at the end of the year the public and. State-guaranteed external debt of Latin America 
reached a total of approximately 125 billion dollars, while the gross total debt, which also includes 
the non-guaranteed bank debt, came to around 195 billion dollars: more than double its amount of 
barely four years before. 
These external sector trends, although undoubtedly disturbing, were accompanied nevertheless 
by others of a favourable nature. Thus, during 1980 the value of Latin America's exports of goods 
once again grew at a markedly high rate (29%) which, although less than the extraordinarily high 
figure of over 34% achieved in 1979, was well over the rates recorded in each year of the 1970s 
except 1973 and 1974, when the value of the region's exports rose at an annual average rate of 
around 50%, primarily as the result of the radical increase in the world price of oil and the likewise 
considerable increases in those years in the prices of a number of other basic commodities on the 
world market. 
What is perhaps more important is that the growth rate of Latin America's exports in 1980 
once again easily exceeded that of world exports, both in value and in volume. Thus, while the value 
of world exports increased by 20% and their volume by barely 1%, the value of Latin American 
exports increased by 29% and their volume by 5.4%. Consequently, the relative share of Latin 
America in the total value of international trade in goods once again increased, recovering for the 
fifth year in succession part of the ground lost during its prolonged and systematic fall in the period 
1961-1975.1 8 
III. ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. The growth rate 
As already noted, in 1980 the dynamism of Latin America's economic growth decreased slightly. 
Thus, the gross domestic product of the region increased by 5.7%, which is a little less than the figure 
for 1979 (6%). Even so, the growth rate achieved in 1980 easily exceeded the rate of around 4.8% per 
year recorded during the period 1976-1978 (see table 17). 
Although the smaller growth rate of the total product of the region was due to the slower 
expansion in 1980 of the economic activity of fourteen of the twenty countries for which informa-
tion is available, it reflected very especially the drop in the economic growth rate of Argentina, which 
is the third largest economy in the region.19 Thus, the gross domestic product of this country, after 
increasing by nearly 7% in 1979, grew by barely 1% in 1980 as a result of the drop in absolute terms 
in the value added by agriculture and the manufacturing sector and the abrupt reduction in the 
growth rate of commercial activity and basic services. Moreover, as a consequence of the very low 
economic growth rate achieved in 1980 and the slow and uneven evolution of global economic 
activity in the second half of the preceding decade, the per capita product of Argentina went down in 
1 7 In the course of the previous decade, the net inflow of capital grew more than fivefold from a little over 
4 900 million dollars in 1970 to almost 26 billion dollars in 1979. During this period, the persistent upward course 
of the flow of capital to the region was only temporarily interrupted in 1976 because of the payments made by 
Venezuela in that year to foreign companies in order to nationalize its oil industry. 
1 8 Over this period, the proportion of world exports accounted for by the exports of Latin America fell 
practically every year, from a value of 7.4% in 1961 to barely 4.2% in 1975. Thanks to its subsequent recovery, 
however, it had risen to 5.1% by the end of 1980. 
19In 1979, the gross domestic product of Argentina was equivalent to around 12% of the total gross 
domestic product of Latin America as a whole. 
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1980 for the fourth time in the last six years, and was practically equal in this year to the rate already 
achieved as long ago as 1974 (see table 18). 
During 1980 there was also a decline in the economic growth rate of the countries of Central 
America, whose growth was affected simultaneously by the contraction of economic activity in the 
United States —which is the main export market for many of them—, the rise in the world price of 
oil, and the climate of uncertainty created by the difficult and changing social and political 
conditions prevailing in some of them. 
The only exception to the generalized decline in economic growth in Central America was in 
Nicaragua, where the gross domestic product increased by nearly 11%, thus partially recovering from 
the acute falls of 7% and 25% suffered in the previous two years as a result of the disruptions to 
economic activity caused by the violent civil war which came to an end in mid-1979 and the social 
and political events which preceded it. 
In El Salvador, in contrast, the continuation and aggravation of the internal conflicts was a 
contributory factor to the decline in the product in absolute terms for the second year running, the 
decline in 1980 being much worse than that of the year before. The overall expansion of the 
Guatemalan economy, for its part, was barely sufficient to give a marginal increase in the per capita 
product, while this went down slightly in Costa Rica and fell by over 2% in Honduras, after four years 
in which it had risen at a high but steadily decreasing rate. The growth rate of economic activity also 
slowed down in Panama, falling from 5.7% in 1979 to 4.9% in 1980, but even so, as in the previous 
two years, it considerably exceeded the relatively slow increase in the population (see tables 17 
and 18). 
As had already happened in 1979, the global economic growth was not sufficient to avoid a 
drop in the per capita product in Bolivia and Venezuela, although in both countries, and especially in 
the latter, the real income increased more than the product because of the improvement for the 
second year running in the terms of trade. The evolution of the terms of trade also favoured Ecuador, 
where the product increased by 5.3%, i.e., at almost the same rate as in the previous two years, but a 
good deal less than the very high rate of around 8.3% per year attained on average during the period 
1970-1977. 
The expansion of economic activity was also slower in 1980 in Colombia and Peru. In the first 
of these countries the product increased by a little over 4%, that is to say, less than in any year of the 
1970s, and in the latter country the economic growth rate declined from 3.4% in 1979 to 3.1% in 
1980, the last-mentioned rate being barely above the increase in the population. The per capita 
product thus remained practically stagnant and this, together with its meagre growth in the previous 
year and its decline during the period 1976-1978, meant that in 1980 it was almost 6% lower than in 
1975 and barely 3% higher than at the beginning of the 1970s. 
In contrast, the economic growth rate rose in 1980 in Brazil, where the product increased by 
8% thanks mainly to the more rapid expansion in that year of the agricultural sector and construc-
tion, the continued increase in industrial production, and the rapid expansion of basic services. 
The most rapid economic expansion in the whole region, however, was once again recorded in 
Paraguay: the Latin American country which grew fastest and most consistently during the second 
half of the 1970s, and where the product registered a notable new increase of 11% in 1980. Although 
it was due to the rapid expansion of practically all the main sectors of the economy, the growth in 
1980 was once again especially stimulated by the extraordinary growth of the construction sector, 
whose product rose by over 30% for the fourth consecutive year as a result of the continuation of 
work on the construction of the great hydroelectric power station at Itaipu (in combination with 
Brazil), the beginning of work on the Yacireta dam (in conjunction with Argentina) and the boom in 
residential construction. The impressive increase in construction activity was also the main force 
behind the also notable increase in fixed investment expenditure, which amounted in 1980 to over 
one-third of the domestic product: a proportion more than double that which was usual in Paraguay 
at the beginning of the past decade and also considerably higher than the fixed investment 
coefficients of the other Latin American economies, except for that of Venezuela. 
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In contrast, the rate of economic expansion went down in Uruguay, Chile and Mexico, the 
three economies which had recorded the highest growth rates after Paraguay in 1979. The decline in 
the growth rate of the product was, however, very different in the three countries. Thus, it was only 
slight in Mexico, where the rate dropped from 8% in 1979 to 7.4% in 1980; moderate in Chile, where 
the drop was from 8.2% to 6.5%, and abrupt in Uruguay, where the economic growth rate of 4.5% 
attained in 1980 was only a little over half the exceptionally high rate of 8.7% achieved the previous 
year. Despite these appreciable differences in the rate of overall economic expansion, however, 
because of the very different rates of population growth the increase in the per capita product was 
only a little less in Uruguay (3.9%) than in Mexico (4.3%), which in turn was below the rate for 
Chile (4.7%). 
Finally, the changes in the growth rates of the economies of the Caribbean for which 
information is available were substantially different from each other. Thus, while in both Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic the gross domestic product rose by 5.2%, thus improving on the increases 
recorded the previous year in both countries, the material product of Cuba,20 which had already 
grown at a very low rate (1.9%) in 1979, rose in 1980 by barely 1.4%. 
This reduction in the growth rate of Cuban production was influenced by the declines of a little 
over 2% suffered in 1980 both by construction and by sugar cane agriculture, where production was 
affected by the spread of sugar cane rust in the previous year, and above all by the drop of 8.5% in 
sugar production, which also had a decisive influence on the scanty increase (0.9%) recorded in 1980 
in manufacturing. In the Dominican Republic, for its part, the acceleration of the growth rate of the 
economy was due to the recovery in both public sector capital expenditure and in personal 
consumption and the steady increase in private investment, and was supported principally at the 
sectoral level by the growth of 5.5% in industrial production, the increase of around 7% in 
construction and basic services, and the still greater expansion of the rest of the service activities. 
In the case of Haiti, a decisive influence in the greater economic dynamism, on the demand 
side, was the big increase in private investment and exports of goods and services —both of which rose 
by around 18%- and on the supply side, the fairly rapid increases recorded in 1980 by agriculture 
(4%), industry (6.5%), basic services (7%) and above all construction (8%). 
2. Total supply and demand 
In 1980, total supply of goods and services increased by 6.3%, which was almost the same as the rate 
recorded the previous year. The maintenance of the growth rate of total supply was due, however, 
entirely to the big expansion recorded for the fourth year running in the volume of imports, which 
almost completely made up for the effects of the decline in the growth rate of the product. Thus, as 
may be seen from table 19, after stagnating in real terms in 1975 and 1976 as a consequence of the 
restrictive policies adopted in many countries of the region in order to cope with the effects of the 
international economic recession and the considerable rise in the world price of oil, imports increased 
at very high rates of 8, 10 and nearly 11% in the following three years, undergoing a further and even 
greater increase of almost 12% in 1980. 
Although this increase partly reflected the greater volume of imports recorded in most of the 
countries of the region, it was especially due to the unusually large increases in 1980 in the real 
imports of goods of Argentina, Mexico and Peru, where in all three cases these imports were more 
than a third bigger than those of the year before. 
As a result of the rapid and persistent increase in the volume of imports, the import coefficient 
rose for the fourth consecutive year, reaching a level of 11.6% in 1980: the highest figure recorded in 
the last 22 years (see table 20). 
In contrast, in 1980 there was a big drop in the growth rate of the volume of exports of goods 
and services. In the previous four years these had increased at an average rate of over 10%, thus 
2 0 Under the system of national accounts used in Cuba, the material product equals the sum of the value of 
the gross production of the agricultural, mining, manufacturing, construction and electricity sectors. 
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forming the most dynamic component of total demand, but in 1980 they increased by only a little 
over 5%, mainly because of the loss of dynamism of international demand and the reduction in the 
volumes of petroleum placed on the world market by all the oil-exporting countries of the region 
except Mexico. Despite the much lower rate at which real exports grew in 1980, the likewise slower 
growth rate of the domestic product in that year meant that the export coefficient only went down 
slightly and thus still remained higher than all the levels recorded in the period 1970-1978. 
In contrast with the loss of dynamism of the volume of exports, in 1980 there was a marked 
increase in the growth rate of gross fixed capital investment. At 8.4%, this was higher than in the 
previous year, and this rate was only a little less than the very high level recorded in the first half of 
the past decade. Thus the investment coefficient, which had risen steadily between 1970 and 1975 
but had almost completely stabilized during the following four years, reached a record level of nearly 
23% in 1980 (see tables 19 and 20). 
IV. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
1. External trade 
In 1980 the external trade of Latin America continued to increase with great dynamism for the fifth 
consecutive year. Thus, the total value of exports of goods and services rose by over 23% after having 
increased by 24% in 1979 and having grown at an average annual rate of almost 13% during the three 
years 1976-1978. As a result, its total value came to over 222 billion dollars in 1980, representing an 
increase of nearly 130% in the last five years. In contrast with what happened in 1979, the rapid 
expansion of external trade in 1980 was due mainly to the growth of imports, the value of which 
increased for the second year running by approximately 26% in contrast with the rise of a little over 
21% recorded in the value of exports. 
As a result of the faster growth of imports than of exports of goods and services, the trade 
deficit, which had gone down from 7 900 to 6 100 million dollars between 1978 and 1979, rose in 
1980 to almost 10 200 million dollars. As in the previous year, however, this variation was the net 
result of the very different changes which took place in the external trade of the six oil-exporting 
countries —Venezuela, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia- and the rest of the 
economies of the region. Thus, while the oil-exporting countries increased their trade surplus from 
430 million dollars in 1979 to almost 3 4 0 0 million in 1980, thanks primarily to the considerable 
improvement recorded for the second year running in their terms of trade, the non-oil-exporting 
countries closed the year with a trade deficit of almost 13 600 million dollars, which was more than 
double the deficit they recorded in 1979 and six times that recorded in 1978. 
(a) Exports of goods 
As already mentioned, the value of Latin America's exports of goods increased by 29% in 1980 
(see table 21). This significant increase -wh ich followed the even larger increase recorded in 1979 
and the substantially smaller but nevertheless significant increases achieved in the three years 
1976-1978- was moreover of a generalized nature, as in the previous four years. Thus, in 1980 the 
value of exports rose in all the countries of the region with the exception of El Salvador -where it 
went down by around 5%- and Nicaragua, where the value of exports fell by over 20%, primarily as 
the result of the big drop in exports of meat and, above all, of the drop of 78% in sales of cotton, 
which has traditionally been the country's main export item and whose production was affected in 
1980 by the delayed impact of the small area planted the previous year. 
The generalized and rapid nature of the increase in the value of exports in the region was also 
manifested by the fact that -qui te apart from Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago, which increased 
their external sales by 74% and 57% respectively, thanks largely to the rise in the world price of oil 
and also, in the case of Mexico, to a big increase in the volume exported— nine countries increased 
the value of their exports by between 21% and 36%, while six others increased this value by between 
11% and 17% (see table 22). 
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Naturally, both the growth rates of external sales of goods and their determining factors were 
very different in the group made up of the six oil-exporting countries and the other economies of the 
region. Thus, while the former increased the value of their exports by the exceptionally large amount 
of 41%, the exports of the latter grew by 19%. This considerable difference in the rates of expansion 
of the value of external sales was entirely due, moreover, to the different paths followed by the unit 
values of the exports of each group, which rose by nearly 36% for the oil-exporting countries while 
they increased by only a little over 12% for the remaining economies of the region. 
Thanks mainly to the very favourable evolution of the international prices of hydrocarbons, the 
external sales of the oil-exporting countries more than doubled in 1980 compared with the figure for 
only two years before, and were scarcely 4% lower than the exports made in that year by the other 
17 economies of the region (see table 27 below). The rises in the international price of petroleum also 
enabled those countries - w i t h the exception of Mexico, which as already noted greatly increased the 
volume of its exports— to obtain much higher income from their external sales in 1980 in spite of the 
fact that at the same time the volume of these sales went down. This reduction in volume was only 
slight (2%) in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, but it was substantial in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, 
where the volume of exports went down by between 6% and 10%, and was particularly marked in 
Venezuela, where the volume fell by nearly 19% (see table 22). 
In the group made up of the remaining economies of the region, in contrast, the much smaller 
increase in the value of exports, although likewise primarily due to the increase in their average price, 
was strengthened in over half the cases by an increase in the volume of the exports. Thus, in this 
group of countries the volume of exports increased by nearly 6% which, although less than the very 
high increases recorded by the same countries in the previous four years, was nevertheless higher than 
the increase of 4% which it is estimated took place in 1980 in the volume of world exports of 
products other than petroleum. 
(b) Imports of goods 
In 1980 the value of Latin American imports of goods rose at a very high rate (31.5%) for the 
second year in succession. Although this exceptional increase was due mainly to the rise of over 18% 
in the average price of these imports, it was also due to the very marked expansion in their volume, 
which went up by 11%, thus exceeding the already very high rate of increase of the previous year and 
indeed that of any year in the 1970s except for the period 1973-1974, when the external trade of 
Latin America underwent very unusual growth (see table 21). 
In contrast with the very uneven evolution of the value of their exports, both the oil-exporting 
and non-oil-exporting countries increased their external purchases at a very similar rate. Indeed, in 
1980 as in 1979, although to a much smaller extent than in the latter year, the rate of increase of the 
value of imports of the non-oil-exporting countries (32%) was higher than that of the oil-exporting 
countries (31%). 
Once again, however, the origin of these changes was very different. Whereas in the oil-
exporting countries the increase in the value of their imports was due primarily to an increase of 16% 
in their volume, in the other economies of the region the main cause was the considerable rise in their 
unit value (24%). 
Among the oil-expoiting economies, the rapid growth of imports was due fundamentally to the 
very large expansion of the purchases made by Mexico and Peru. In the first of these countries, the 
value of imports increased by around 50% for the second year running and their volume grew by 
one-third, as had already occurred in 1979. Due to these unusually large increases and the also 
considerable growth which had been recorded in 1978, the value of Mexican imports more than 
trebled in the last-three years, while over the same period their volume more than doubled (see 
table 23). 
The expansion of imports in the case of Peru was even greater in 1980, since the value of that 
country's external purchases of goods increased by almost 56%, while their volume rose by 38%. 
Unlike the case of Mexico, however, in Peru the increase in imports recorded in 1980 came after 
considerably more moderate growth of external purchases in 1979, which in turn had been preceded 
by big drops in absolute terms in the volumes imported during the previous three years. Because of 
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this, even in 1980 the volume of Peruvian imports was almost 20% lower than in 1975 in spite of the 
increases recorded in the last two years. 
In contrast with the strong and persistent expansion of the volume of imports in Mexico and 
the partial recovery of this item in Peru, imports of goods declined in real terms in Bolivia and 
Venezuela, as had already happened in 1979 too, and stagnated completely in Ecuador. 
Although, as already mentioned, the value of imports grew considerably in all the non-oil-
exporting economies except Guatemala and Costa Rica (where the increase was only around 6%) and 
El Salvador (where external purchases actually went down), the volume of imports rose sharply only 
in Guyana, Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and above all Argentina and Nicaragua (see 
table 23). 
In l.he last-named country, imports almost doubled in real terir s because of the recovery of 
economic activity and :ieed to make up for the drops in agricultural production. Even so, however, 
because of the enormous drop in imports in the previous two years, the volume imported in 1980 was 
still nearly 30% less than in 1977. In Argentina, on the other hand, the volume of imports rose by 
more than a third for the second year running, under the stimulus of the decline in the real exchange 
rate and the gradual reduction of tariffs, and in 1980 amounted to almost twice the level of only two 
years before. 
In the other non-oil-exporting economies, the increase in the value of imports was due basically 
to the rise in their average prices, which went up considerably as a result of the acceleration of 
inflation in the industrialized economies and the big new increases in the world prices of oil in 1980. 
The decisive influence of the latter was also to be seen in the big increases recorded once again 
in 1980 in the total cost of imports of crude oil and petroleum products and the further increase in 
the share of these imports in the total value of external purchases of goods. Thus, in 1980 the cost of 
petroleum imports rose by between 24% and 43% in Haiti, Panama, El Salvador, Guyana, Guatemala 
and the Dominican Republic; by around 50% in Paraguay, Honduras, Brazil and Uruguay; and by over 
130% in Nicaragua. Since imports of oil had also increased by very large amounts the previous year, 
their value in 1980 was approximately double that recorded in 1978 in all the countries in this group 
except Colombia, Costa Rica, Guyana and Jamaica (see table 24). 
Moreover, in 1980 the proportion of total imports represented by purchases of petroleum and 
petroleum products continued to increase. For the non-oil-exporting countries, this proportion was 
rather more than 26%, nearly four times the level of 1970 and one and a half times higher than the 
proportion recorded in 1973, which was the year before the first set of radical rises in hydrocarbon 
prices. Although this high level was strongly influenced by the extraordinarily large share (41%) 
which purchases of fuels accounted for in 1980 in the total imports of Brazil, it also reflected the 
growing incidence of purchases of oil in the imports of the Central American economies, the 
Caribbean countries, and Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, in most of which the proportion of total 
imports represented by purchases of hydrocarbons was almost three time the percentages corre-
sponding to 1973 (see table 24). 
(c) The purchasing power of exports and the terms of trade 
Thanks to the increase in the volume of exports and the further rise in the terms of trade, the 
purchasing power of Latin America's exports of goods increased by almost 9% in 1980. Thus, the 
purchasing power of the region's exports, after having suffered an abrupt fall in 1975, rapidly 
expanded in the following five years and almost doubled between 1970 and 1980 (see table 25). 
However, not only was the rate of increase of the purchasing power of exports considerably 
lower in 1980 than in the previous year, but its evolution and determining factors were very different 
in the oil-exporting countries and the other economies of the region. Thus, while in the former the 
purchasing power of external sales of goods, which had already increased very sharply in 1979, rose 
by nearly 26% in 1980, in the latter it went down by 4% after having risen very slightly in the 
previous two years. 
As in 1979, but to an even greater extent, the increase in the purchasing power of exports of 
the six oil-exporting countries was due mainly to the improvement of the terms of trade. Indeed, in 
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all of them except Mexico the rise in the terms of trade was the exclusive cause of the increase, since 
the volume of their exports went down. 
For the group of oil-exporting countries as a whole, the external terms of trade rose by over 
20%, thus attaining in 1980 a level more than twice as high as that of 1970 (see table 26). Naturally, 
the increase was even greater in countries like Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, which, unlike 
Mexico and Peru, had also benefited from the first wave of oil price rises, so that their terms of trade 
rose by around 400% over the last ten years. 
In the oil-importing countries, in contrast, the purchasing power of their exports went down in 
spite of the fact that their external sales increased by almost 6% in real terms. Basically, this was due 
entirely to the considerable deterioration suffered by their terms of trade for the third year running. 
These terms dropped by over 9%, thus representing a total fall of 25% between 1970 and 1980, and 
furthermore, as in 1979, this drop in the external terms of trade was generalized, for in 1980 it 
affected all the oil-importing countries except Barbados (which benefited from the exceptional rise in 
the price of sugar in this year), Guyana and Jamaica (which were favoured by the substantial increases 
in the prices of bauxite and alumina and also benefited from the rise in sugar prices), and the 
Dominican Republic (which received both the advantages of the rise in sugar prices and those deriving 
from the notable increase in the prices of gold and silver). In contrast, because of the heavy incidence 
of oil purchases in the value of their imports, the terms of trade went down considerably in Brazil and 
Uruguay, so that the terms of trade index recorded a cumulative drop of nearly 40% in both countries 
between 1970 and 1980, and this index continued to go down in Chile, where it dropped in 1980 to a 
level equivalent to only a little over half of that corresponding to 1970. 
2. The balance of payments 
(a) The trade and current account balances 
As a result of the slightly more rapid growth of imports of goods (31.5%) than of exports of 
merchandise, visible trade underwent a moderate turnaround in 1980, since after registering a small 
surplus of a little over 500 million dollars in 1979, it closed with a deficit of one billion dollars in 
1980. Since at the same time the net outlays in respect of non-factor payments continued to increase 
rapidly, the trade deficit for Latin America as a whole increased from nearly 6 100 to nearly 10 200 
million dollars (see table 27). 
As in 1979, however, these overall changes represented the net result of the divergent paths 
observable in the external trade of the six oil-exporting countries and the other economies of the 
region. 
Thus, in the former the growth rate of the value of exports of goods (41%) considerably 
exceeded that of imports (31%), as in the previous year. As a result, the trade balance -which had 
undergone a radical turnaround between 1978 and 1979 in changing from a deficit of over 5 600 
million dollars to a surplus of a little over 400 million— generated a much larger surplus of nearly 
3 400 million dollars in 1980. 
In the non-oil-exporting countries, in contrast, the value of imports of goods rose in 1980 much 
faster (32%) than exports of goods (19%), as in the previous two years. As a result of this and of an 
increase of about one-third in net outlays in respect of non-factor service payments, the deficit on 
their trade in goods and services rose to the unprecedented level of almost 13 600 million dollars, 
which was more than double the deficit of the previous year and over six times that recorded in 1978 
(see table 27). 
Moreover, in 1980 net remittances of profits and interest continued to rise at a rapid rate, 
amounting to 17 700 million dollars for the region as a whole, which is double the amount of 
payments made under this heading only three years before and 70% higher than the trade deficit 
recorded in 1980. Consequently, the current account deficit of the region increased for the fourth 
year running, attaining a record level of 27 400 million dollars (see table 28). Although in absolute 
terms this amount was considerably greater than the deficits generated by balance-of-payments 
current-account operations in any previous year, it nevertheless represented a smaller proportion of 
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exports of goods and services than the deficit recorded in 1978 and, above all, that registered in 1975 
(see table 29). 
Once again, however, the overall figures conceal very divergent performances as between the 
oil-exporting countries on the one hand and the other economies of the region on the other. Thus, 
whereas in the former the current-account deficit went down for the second year running and was 
equivalent to only 40% of the deficit recorded in 1978, in the latter the deficit rose even more 
markedly than in previous years to the unprecedented level of nearly 23 700 million dollars, which is 
two-thirds higher than the deficit for 1979 and almost three times the deficit recorded barely two 
years before. 
Furthermore, the current-account deficit of the non-oil-exporting countries in 1980 represented 
a much higher proportion of their exports of goods and services (47%) than in any of the preceding 
four years and even slightly exceeded the percentages recorded during the period of international 
crisis and of big increases in oil prices in the mid-1970s. In contrast, the proportion of exports 
represented by the joint deficit of the oil-exporting countries was not only much lower (7%), but was 
also the lowest recorded in the entire period 1970-1980 except for 1974, the year in which these 
countries achieved a considerable surplus because of the abrupt rise in the world price of hydrocar-
bons (see table 29). 
Even these figures, however, do not fully reflect the diversity of the different national 
situations, especially within the group of oil-exporting countries. Thus, the appreciable reduction in 
the current-account deficit of these countries was due largely to the radical change observed in the 
balance-of-payments current-account operations of Venezuela which, after drastically reducing its 
current-account deficit of 5 700 million dollars in 1978 to less than 300 million dollars in 1979, 
achieved a surplus of over 2 600 million dollars in 1980. This sharp reversal of the balance-of-
payments current-account operations was due to the extraordinary expansion of exports —whose 
value in 1980 amounted to nearly 18 500 million dollars (more than double the 1978 value) even 
though their volume went down by approximately 13% between these years— and the moderate 
increase in imports, which barely rose in value from 11 200 million dollars in 1978 to 11 900 million 
in 1980, while in real terms they actually went down by rather more than 10% (see tables 27 and 28). 
In Mexico, in contrast, the current account deficit increased considerably once again to an 
amount which was over double that recorded barely two years before. This considerable increase in 
the deficit took place in spite of the enormous expansion over this period of time in exports of goods, 
whose value rose from nearly 6 450 million dollars in 1978 to almost 16 400 million in 1980, mainly 
because of the big increases in the volume and average price of the petroleum exported. This notable 
increase in the value of exports was, however, more than cancelled out by the joint effect of the 
increase in imports of goods —which, like exports of goods, rose by approximately 10 billion dollars 
between 1978 and 1980— and the very big rise in net payments of profits and interest, which almost 
doubled over this period, rising from a little under 2 800 million dollars in 1978 to nearly 5 400 
million in 1980. Even so, despite the considerable increase in the absolute amount of the current 
account deficit, it still represented in 1980 around 24% of the value of exports of goods and services 
—a proportion similar to those recorded in the previous three years and only half the very high levels 
recorded in the mid-1970s. Moreover, the current account deficit of Mexico represented less than 4% 
of the gross domestic product in 1 9 8 0 - one of the lowest proportions registered in this year in Latin 
America. 
In contrast, the considerable increase in the balance-of-payments current account deficit of the 
non-oil-exporting countries reflected a generalized trend, as the deficit went down only in Guatemala. 
At the same time, however, most of the absolute variation in the deficit was due, as always, to the 
changes in the current account situation of the relatively larger economies. 
Among these, the most important change took place in Argentina, whose deficit rose from 
470 million dollars in 1979 to 4 900 million in 1980, basically as a result of the very big expansion 
which took place for the second year running in the value of imports of goods (56%) and the increase 
of barely 2% in total exports of goods. 
The increase in the current account deficit of Brazil, in contrast, was considerably more 
moderate, above all in relative terms, and was due almost entirely to the bigger net payments of 
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profits and interest and the increase in the deficit on invisible trade, since both exports and imports 
of goods rose by around 5 billion dollars during 1980. 
The deficit of the non-oil-exporting countries was also accentuated by the big absolute increase 
in the current account deficit of Chile (which rose from a little under 1 200 million dollars in 1979 to 
almost 1 800 million in 1980) and the considerable turnaround registered in the current account 
operations of Colombia, which, after achieving a surplus of 530 million dollars in 1979, turned in a 
deficit of 350 million in 1980, and Nicaragua (where the surplus of 100 million dollars obtained the 
year before was replaced by a deficit of 440 million in 1980). 
If instead of the absolute increases in the current account deficits we consider the relation 
between these and the value of exports of goods and services, however, the conclusions which are to 
be drawn are different. Thus, as may be seen from table 29, the highest values of this coefficient in 
1980 were not registered in Brazil or Argentina or in Chile or Colombia, but were concentrated in the 
relatively smaller economies such as Nicaragua, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and 
Costa Rica. Moreover, in all these countries, and also in Panama and :Guyana, the proportion of 
exports represented by the current account deficit was much greater in 1980 than during the 
international crisis which took place in the period 1974-1975. Finally, in all these economies the 
current account deficit in 1980 was equivalent to very high proportions of the domestic product, 
ranging from 8% in Haiti to 17% in Nicaragua and Guyana, and was thus much higher than the figures 
of 1% for Colombia, a little over 3% for Argentina, 5% for Brazil, and a little over 6% for Chile. 
(b) The capital account 
In 1980 there was stagnation in the net flow of capital to Latin America, for after increasing 
steadily at a rapid rate during the 1970s this flow went down slightly from 26 billion dollars in 1979 
to a little over 25.9 billion in 1980. The net total of investments and credits received by the region 
was also below the total current account deficit, and finally the Latin American balance of payments, 
which had always generated a surplus since 1963, closed in 1980 with a negative balance of 1 500 
million dollars (see table 29). 
These changes in the trends of capital movements and the balance of payments at the regional 
level only represent the final result of changes in opposing directions recorded in different countries, 
however. 
Thus, the slight drop in the net financial resources received by Latin America as a whole was due 
primarily to the marked difference in the capital movements of Venezuela -which, after receiving 
nearly 1 300 million dollars in 1979, had an outflow of capital of over 3 300 million in 1 9 8 0 - and 
the considerable decline suffered by the net flow of financial resources to Argentina, which went 
down between these two years from 4 750 million dollars to a little over 2 200 million. 
During 1980 there was also a reversal of the direction of movements of capital in Trinidad and 
Tobago and Guatemala, while there was a decline in the net amount of investments and loans received 
by Bolivia and Haiti. 
The net inflow of capital increased in all the other countries of the region, however, and for 
these countries as a whole the total was approximately 7 500 million dollars more than in 1979. 
This considerable increase was mainly due to the substantial absolute growth shown by capital 
movements to Mexico, Brazil and Chile and the rapid relative expansion observed in the case of 
Colombia and the Dominican Republic. 
In Mexico, the net financial resources received rose strongly for the third year running, reaching 
a little over 7 billion dollars, which is almost four times the amount of the capital inflow three years 
before. The evolution was very similar in Chile, where the net inflow of capital was over 3 billion 
dollars in 1980: four times that of the net investments and credits received in 1977. In the case of 
Brazil, in contrast, although the net flow of capital in 1980 was greater than that received by Mexico, 
and although this also represented a considerable increase with respect to the resources received the 
previous year, it was still far from recovering the level reached in 1978, when this inflow reached its 
historic peak of almost 11 billion dollars (see table 28). 
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In contrast, in 1980 there was a marked increase in the net flow of investments and loans to 
Colombia and the Dominican Republic, and although the absolute levels —1 500 and 840 million 
dollars respectively- were considerably less than the figures for Brazil, Mexico and Chile, nevertheless 
in both countries they represented three times the amounts of barely two years before. 
The abrupt turnaround of the region's balance of payments, which closed 1980 with a deficit of 
1 500 million dollars after having registered a surplus of 6 650 million dollars in 1979, was also the 
end result of the very varied changes which occurred in the different countries of the region. Thus, 
this turnaround was due almost entirely to the change in the balance-of-payments situation of the 
non-oil-exporting economies, which turned in a deficit of 3 700 million dollars in 1980 after having 
generated a surplus of almost 3 800 million the year before. In contrast, the smaller surplus of the 
oil-exporting countries accounted for less than 9% of the deterioration in the balance of payments of 
the region between these two years. 
The clearly different balance-of-payments results of the two groups of countries were also due 
to the opposite tendencies predominating in some of the economies within each group. Thus, the 
main cause of the reduction in the surplus of the group of six oil-exporting economies from 
approximately 2 950 million dollars in 1979 to a little under 2 200 million in 1980 was the abrupt 
turnabout observed for the second year running in the balance of payments of Venezuela, which, 
after passing from a deficit of 2 200 million dollars in 1978 to a surplus of over 1 billion dollars the 
following year, again closed with a deficit of 700 million dollars in 1980. The effects of this change, 
of the shift from a small surplus to a moderate deficit in Bolivia, and of the reduction of the surplus 
achieved in 1979 by Peru could not be completely compensated for by the considerable increase in 
Mexico's surplus and the increase of around 200 million dollars in the balance of payments of both 
Ecuador and Trinidad and Tobago. 
As regards the non-oil-exporting countries, over nine-tenths of the deterioration of almost 
7 500 million dollars suffered by the balance of payments of this group of countries between 1979 
and 1980 was due to the turnaround in the balance of payments of Argentina. Basically as a result of 
the very rapid expansion of imports, the near stagnation of the value of exports and the reduction to 
less than half of ¿he net inflow of capital, the surplus of almost 4 300 million dollars recorded by this 
country in 1979 was replaced by a deficit of nearly 2 700 million in 1980. 
Even so, however, this deficit was less than that of almost 3 300 million dollars registered in 
this year by the balance of payments of Brazil, which thus suffered a loss of international reserves 
slightly greater than that which had already undergone in 1979. 
In 1980 the balance of payments also closed with a deficit in Guyana, Haiti and all the 
economies of Central America except Costa Rica and Panama. 
In contrast, the rest of the non-oil-exporting economies managed to secure overall surpluses on 
their balance of payments, but these only reached substantial levels in Chile and Colombia, whose 
surpluses were, together with that of Mexico, the largest in the region (see table 28). 
These balance-of-payments results were naturally reflected in the international reserves position 
at the end of the year. For the region as a whole these reserves went down from 40.8 billion dollars at 
the end of 1979 to a little over 39 billion dollars in December 1980, thus interrupting the steady and 
rapid accumulation of reserves observed in previous years. 
As may be seen from table 30, the biggest declines in absolute terms were those observed in the 
reserves of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. In the case of the first of these countries, the drop was 
from almost 9 400 million dollars in 1979 to a little over 6 700 million in 1980, but even so, because 
of their extraordinary increase in the previous three years, Argentina's reserves at the end of 1980 
continued to be the largest of the whole region, and were also much larger than those which that 
country possessed at the end of 1978. 
In Brazil, in contrast, the reserves went down by around 3 billion dollars for the second year 
running and thus fell to their lowest level of the past five years, equivalent to barely half the reserves 
existing at the end of 1978. 
In Venezuela the reserves went down for the fourth time in the last five years, so that their level 
at the end of 1980 was lower than in any of the previous five years except 1978. 
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The sharpest falls in reserves in relative terms, however, were those registered in Haiti -where 
the reserves fell by more than 70%— and in Bolivia and El Salvador, where the drop was over 40%. As 
a result of these declines and of the uneven performance of the reserves in previous years, the 
international reserves of Bolivia and Haiti at the end of 1980 were only half what they had been in 
1977, while those of El Salvador were only a little over one-third of the reserves existing at the end of 
that year. 
The gross international reserves of Mexico and Peru, however, rose by around 57% during 1980, 
with the result that the Mexican reserves in December 1980 were almost double those of three years 
before, while the Peruvian reserves, which expanded by an exceptional amount in 1979, increased 
more than six times over the same period of time. 
Similarly, the reserves increased for the fifth consecutive year in both Colombia and Chile. As a 
result, the Colombian reserves at the end of the year were the highest in Latin America after those of 
Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil, while the Chilean reserves reached a similar level to those of Mexico, 
having increased almost eightfold between 1977 and 1980 (see table 30). 
3. The external debt 
In 1980 the external indebtedness of Latin America continued to grow. According to preliminary 
calculations, it is estimated that the public and State-guaranteed private external debt of the region as 
a whole at the end of the year came to a total of approximately 12 500 million dollars: almost three 
times the total for barely five years before. Moreover, as in 1979, the rate of increase of the 
non-guaranteed bank debt was much greater in 1980 than that of the public and State-guaranteed 
debt, so that the total gross indebtedness once again underwent an appreciable increase and at the end 
of the year it was estimated to be around 195 billion dollars (see table 31). 
In relative terms, however, the increases in the main components of the external debt, 
excluding non-guaranteed bank debt, were less in 1980 than in previous years. Thus, the growth rate 
of a little over 12% in the public and State-guaranteed external debt was the lowest of the last ten 
years, while the rate of nearly 17% registered by total gross indebtedness was the smallest since 1975, 
which is the first year for which information is available on this indicator. These growth rates were 
also considerably below the increase of 21% registered in 1980 in the value of exports of goods and 
services, thus repeating the situation of the year before, when these exports rose by 32% while public 
and State-guaranteed debt increased rather less than 18% and total gross indebtedness grew by 23.5%. 
At the same time, however, since as already noted Latin America's gross international reserves 
went down in 1980, the rate of increase of the total net indebtedness (23%) was considerably higher 
in this year than that of gross indebtedness and also slightly exceeded the value of exports of goods 
and services. Thus, at the end of 1980 the total net debt came to 156 billion dollars, which was 
exactly four times the figure registered four years earlier (see table 31). 
V. I N F L A T I O N 
During 1980 inflation was once again very pronounced in Latin America. For the region as a whole, 
the weighted average variation in consumer prices was somewhat over 56%, slightly higher than the 
figure of 54% for 1979, and considerably higher than the rates of roughly 40% in the previous two 
years.21 As in 1979, the inflationary process was also quite widespread; of the 23 countries for which 
information is available only Guatemala, Haiti and Paraguay were able to hold their inflation rates 
below 10% (see table 32). 
2 1 The weighting factor used to calculate the regional average is country population. As the rate of growth of 
prices was much higher in the larger countries, the simple average of regional inflation in 1980 was considerably 
lower (27.9%). Although this rate is lower than the 3 5.7% forl979, it was higher than the figures for 1978(25 .7% 
and 19 77 (24.7%). 
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Nevertheless, the intensity and trends of inflation varied considerably in the different 
economies of the region. Thus, while consumer price rises fluctuated around 90% in Brazil and 
Argentina, and amounted to 61% in Peru and 43% in Uruguay, they ranged between 21% and 31% in 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico and Chile and between 14% and 19% in 
most Central American and Caribbean countries. Furthermore, while the rate of inflation increased in 
8 countries, it dropped in the remaining 15. 
The significance and implications of the inflation rate also differed in each case. For example, 
in Argentina the rise of nearly 90% in prices, while enormous, represented a considerable drop from 
the rate of almost 140% in 1979, and meant that for the first time since 1974 the country had less 
than three-digit inflation. 
The very similar rate recorded in Brazil, on the other hand, represented a new upsurge of the 
inflationary process; inflation in 1980 was more than double the average for 1975-1978. The great 
accentuation of the inflationary process in Brazil was even more evident in wholesale price trends. In 
1980 the latter rose by 120%, well above the 80% rise in the previous year, and four times the average 
rate between 1975 and 1978. 
The significance of the relatively similar inflation rates in Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico and Chile 
in 1980 was again very diverse, especially if in each case the rate of inflation is contrasted with that of 
the previous year, and above all when considered in a longer time span. 
The highest inflation in these four countries was in Chile, where consumer prices rose by over 
31%. However, this rise represented an appreciable drop from the 39% recorded in 1979, and also 
meant the continuation of the steady downward trend begun in 1974 and only interrupted in 1979 as 
a result of the combined effects of higher international oil prices, the rise in international inflation 
and the devaluation of the peso in the middle of that year. 
The rise of nearly 27% in consumer prices in Colombia in 1980, on the other hand, was only 
slightly below the rate of nearly 30% in 1979; in practice, Colombian inflation continued to display 
the noteworthy stability it has shown since 1973 (see table 32). 
In contrast with the cases of Chile and Colombia, the rise of nearly 30% in the Mexican price 
level in 1980 represented a considerable acceleration of the rate of inflation, both with respect to 
1979 and especially in comparison with the far more moderate rates generally prevailing in Mexico 
until 1972. 
The trends and extent of inflation in Jamaica during 1980 were similar to those in Mexico. 
Consumer prices rose by nearly 30%, a figure not only more than 10 percentage points above that of 
the previous year, but also the highest in the country's history, with the exception of the 46% 
recorded in 1978 mainly as a result of the large successive devaluations of the Jamaican dollar in that 
year. 
The contrast between the inflation in 1980 and past levels was also noteworthy in Peru, and 
still more striking in Venezuela. In the latter country, the 22% rate in 1980, while only slightly above 
that of 1979, was almost triple the average annual rate of inflation during the period 1975-1978, and 
seven times above the rates usual in that country before 1974. 
In turn, the 61% rise in consumer prices in Peru in 1980 meant that for the second consecutive 
year there was a slight drop in the rate of inflation, but also that inflation remained far above both 
price rises in the period 1973-1977, and especially trends in the early 1970s, when the average annual 
rate was barely 6%. 
On the other hand, in Uruguay the 43% rise in 1980 not only represented a halving of the 
exceptionally high rate recorded in 1979, but also was one of the lowest rates in the last ten years. In 
the remaining economies of the region —in most of which inflation was traditionally very low until 
the 1970s, but rose sharply in 1973-1974 and again in 1979 on account of the higher world oil prices 
and the rise in inflation in the industrialized countries— the growth rate of consumer prices dropped 
moderately in 1980, but was again very high in historical terms, fluctuating between 14% and 19% 
(see table 32). 
The only exceptions in this group were Bolivia and Nicaragua, both countries having an 
inflation rate of about 24%. 
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In Bolivia, this figure represented a sharp drop in comparison with the very high level in 1979, 
when consumer prices rose by over 45%, mainly as a result of the big devaluation of the peso in 
November after 7 years of exchange rate stability. Despite the considerable drop in the rate of 
inflation during 1980,- it remained well above the rates recorded in all years of the previous decades 
with the exception of the rises of between 35% and 40% recorded in 1973 and 1974. 
The rise of nearly 25% in consumer prices meant that the rate of inflation dropped even more 
markedly in Nicaragua, where consumer prices in 1979 had risen by the record rate of 70% as a result 
of the devaluation of over 40% in April and the upheavals resulting from the civil war which came to 
an end in the middle of that year. Despite this drop, the rate of growth of prices in 1980 remained 
considerably higher than prior to 1979. 
Although the determinants of inflation, and their relative impact on the rate of growth of 
prices, varied considerably from country to country, it is evident that international inflation-was once 
again one of the main causes of the strong inflationary process that affected the region in 1980. 
The average prices of imports, which had already risen by nearly 16% in 1979, increased by 
over 18% in 1980, thus generating great pressure upon costs and the domestic price level (see table 33). 
Naturally, as a result of the fresh large increases in world oil prices in the course of the year, the 
rise in the unit cost of imports was much higher in the oil-importing countries: nearly 24% in 1980. 
This increase, together with that of over 20% in the preceding year, meant that the average price of 
imports of those countries jumped by nearly 50% during 1979-1980.2 2 
However, on account of the heightened inflationary processes in most of the industrialized 
countries, with the ensuing effect upon the price of manufactures, imported inflation in 1980 had a 
more general effect on the Latin American economies, including those which are net oil exporters. 
In addition, the inflationary effect of the rise in import prices was in some cases compounded 
by that of the rise in the prices of Latin American exports in 1980. Following a drop of about 4% in 
1978 and a 21% rise in 1979, these rose by over 22% in 1980. Although this increase was much 
greater for the oil-exporting countries (36%) than for the other economies of the region (12%), in the 
latter too the average rise in export prices in 1980 was slightly higher than in the previous year, and 
therefore exerted additional upwards pressure on domestic prices. 
22Nevertheless, this rise was smaller than the 67% increase in these countries' average import prices during 
the first round of world oil price hikes during 1973-1974. 
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Table 33 
WORLD GHOSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates) 
1971- 1976- 1979 1980 
1980 1978 (a) 
World 4.1 4.7 3.8 2.2 
Centrally Planned Economies (b) 5.5 5.5 3.3 3.1 
Developed Market Economies (c) 3.3 1.3 3.7 1.5 Developing Countries (d) 5.7 5.2 4.8 3.9 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) The data are for Eastern Europe, USSR and China and represent the net material product. 
(c) Including South Africa. 
(d) Including Israel and Turkey. 
Table 2 
WORLD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
(Growth rates) 




World 8.9 2.4 . -3.4 8.1 4.6 4.2 4.4 1.5 7.1 
Centrally Planned 
8.3 Economies (b) 8.9 8.8 6.5 6.5 5.7 4.3 3.8 11.4 
Developed Market 
Economies (c) 8.9 - -7.2 8.4 3.7 4.1 5.0 0.4 5.3 Developing i 
Countries 10.8 3.3 -4.4 9.1 5.8 2.0 2.4 1.8 8.4 
Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, February 1981, and CEPAL estimates. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Eastern Europe, USSR, and China. 
(c) Including Israel and South Africa. 
Table 3 
OECD: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
(Growth rates) 




OECD 6.3 0.7 -0.5 5.3 3.7 3.9 3.3 1.4 3-8 
France 5.4 3.2 0.2 5.2 2.8 3.6 3.3 1.6 4.4 
Germany 4.9 0.5 -1.8 5.2 3.0 3.3 4.5 1.8 3.5 
Japan 10.0 -0.3 1.4 6.5 5.4 5.9 5.9 5.5 6.6 
United Kingdom 7.5 -1.2 -0.8 4.2 1.0 3.6 1.5 -3.0 2.3 United States 5.4 -1.3 -1.0 5.6 5.1 4.4 2.3 -0.2 2.9 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook No. 28, December 1980, and CEPAL, on the basis of official data, 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
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Table 33 
COMERCIAL BANK LENDING RATES TO PRIME BORROWERS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Percentage rates at the end of December) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
France 11.65 11.35 10.95 13.65 13.10 
Germany 6.50 6.00 5.50 9.75 11.50 
Japan 7.12 5.17 1.50 6.31 8.30 
United Kingdom 15.50 8.00 13.50 18.00 15.00 
United States 6.00 7.75 11.75 15.25 21.50 




ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMMESTIC PRODUCT 
1971- 1976- 1978 1979 1980 
1980 1978 (a) 
Africa(b) 1.8 6.0 1.8 6.2 5.3 
South and East Asia 5.6 6.8 7.1 2.9 1.7 
Western Asia (c) 6.1 2.8 1.1 3.7 0.5 
Latin America 5.8 1.8 1.7 6.0 5.7 Memorandum item 
Net energy exporters 5.8 5.0 1.1 5.5 1.0 
Net energy importers 5.6 5.1 5.0 1.3 3.9 
Source: CEPAL, on the basi3 of official data. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Excluding South Africa. 
(c) Including Israel and Turkey. 
Table 6 
0ECD: CONSUMER PRICES 
(Percentage annual average change) 
1961- 1971 1977 1978 1979 1980 
1970 1976 (a) 
OECD 3.3 8.5 8.9 7.9 9.8 12.5 
France 1.0 9.0 9.1 9.1 10.5 13.3 
Germany 2.7 5.9 3.7 2.7 1.1 5.5 Japan 5.8 11.2 8.1 3.8 3.6 8.0 
United Kingdom 1.1 13.6 15.8 8.3 13.1 18.0 
United ; States 2.8 6.6 6.5 7.7 11.3 13.5 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, December 1980, No. 26, p. 17; IMF, International Financial 
Statistics; and CEPAL, on t h e ba3ls o f official data. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
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Table 33 
SELECTED INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES(a) 
(1973=100) 




1973 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1974 94.7 105.3 99.4 100.8 95.1 1975 102.6 100.4 87.9 104.3 98.6 1976 100.1 101.2 88.9 96.6 100.1 
1977 96.6 102.7 93.7 101.7 ' 99.9 1978 97.3 103.4 107.5 106.5 95.4 1979 99.2 104.2 96.2 118.9 95.6 1980 101.0 101.2 93.9 137.1 97.8 
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., World Financial Markets (various issues), 
(a) The index of the real effective exchange rate is based on the trade-weighted exchange rate 
adjusted for inflation differentials which are measured by the wholesale prices of non-food 
manufactures. 
Table 8 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CHANGE IN CONSUMER PRICES 





1977 1978 1979 
January-June 
1979 1980 
Daveloping countries (a) 8.9 19.4 21.3 18.3 24.4 23-2 41.6 
Africa (b) 6.1 15.7 18.6 17.5 16.3 17.0 18.8 South and East Asia 6.6 12.6 8.7 6.4 11.7 9.4 13.5 
West Asia (c) 6.5 21.1 24.2 24.3 31.5 32.2 84.4 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (d) 12.4 26.0 32.6 27.0 35.8 33.5 55.5 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues) and CEPAL, on the basis of 
official data. " 
(a) Including Yugoslavia but excluding Argentina, Chile and Ghana. 
(b) Excluding Ghana and South Africa. 
(c) Including Israel and Turkey. 
(d) Excluding Argentina and Chile. 
Table 9 
VALUE OF WORLD TRADE Bi AREAS(a) 
Exports (FOB) Import (CIF) 
World 
Developed Market Economies (c) 
Oil-exporting Developing countries 
Non-oil Developing Countries 
Centrally Planned Economies(d) 
Source: GATT, Press Release, 10 March 1981. 
(a) Note that due to different sources of information the country classifications used in this 
table are not entirely compatible with those employed in earlier tables of this world summary. 
(b) Preliminary figures, 
(e) Including South Africa, 
(d) FOB. 
1979 1980(b) 1979 1980 1979 1980(b) 1979 1980 
Billions of Growth Billions of Growth 
dollars rates dollars rates 
1 638 1 985 25 21 1 689 2 050 25 21 
1 046 1 228 22 17 1 151 1 375 28 19 
207 294 45 42 105 136 7 30 
199 247 27 24 249 320 25 29 
151 176 21 17 152 173 15 14 
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Table 33 
PRICES OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES 
(1975=100) 
Jan.-Sept. 
1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
1979 1980 
Primary commodities 57 101 100 106 117 119 154 145 
131 
223 
155 Developed Market Economies 82 103 100 102 106 115 13« Developing Market Economies 1)4 104 100 108 121 121 165 153 260 Food 87 111 100 105 120 121 136 133 157 Developed Market Economies 89 108 100 99 100 113 131 128 149 Developing Market Economies 83 119 100 118 165 138 148 143 176 Agricultural raw material 101 120 100 112 121 132 159 158 166 Developed Market Economies 100 "3 100 109 119 124 149 149 153 Developing Market Economies 103 130 100 118 132 146 175 174 186 Non-ferrous metals 106 131 100 109 117 126 167 163 188 Developed Market Economies 100 123 100 108 117 126 165 1ST Ï8S Developing Market Economies 122 150 100 112 117 127 172 168 193 Primary commodities excluding 
petroleum 85 107 100 106 118 121 138 135 155 Developed Market Economies Î5 103 100 102 105 115 132 130 W Developing Market Economies 85 116 100 115 141 133 149 146 171 
Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, February 1981. 
Table 11 
WORLD CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES(a) 
(Billions of dollars) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(b) 
Industrial Countries -20 2 -16 -23 15 -36 -74 Oil-exporting Developing Countries 60 27 37 29 5 68 115 
Non-oil-exporting Developing Countries -26 -30 -18 -13 -23 -36 -50 
Centrally Planned Economies -10 -18 -13 -9 -10 -3 -7 
Source: GATT, Press Release, 10 March 1981; OECD, Economic Outlook, No 20, December 1980, and 
CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) After official transfers. Due to different sources of information the country classifications 
used in this table are not entirely compatible with those employed in earlier tables of this 
world summary. 
(b) Preliminary figures. 
Table 12 
PUBLICIZED EUROCURRENCY CREDITS 
(Billions of dollars or equivalent) 
Growth rates 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(a) 
-• 1978 1979 1980 
Total 20.6 28. .7 34.2 73.7 70.2 66.2 115.5 -4.8 -5.7 
Industrialized Countries 5.1 8. 3 11.1 31.3 19.0 28.8 182.0 -39.3 51.6 Developing Countries (b) 12.5 17. • 3 20.2 38.3 43.2 34.5 89.6 12.8 -20.1 
(Oil Exporters) (0.3) (1. .6) (3.3) (2.7) (0.7) (0.4) (-18.2) (74.1) (-42.9) 
Centrally Planned 102.7 -69.3 Economies 2.7 2 .4 2.7 3-7 7.5 2.3 37.0 
Other 0.3 0. 7 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 100.0 25.0 20.0 
Source: World Bank. 
(a) Preliminary estimate. 
(b) Note that the World Bank includes the Mediterranean region of Europe in this group. 
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Table 33 
PUBLICIZED FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES 
(Billions of dollars or equivalent) 
Growth rates 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(a) 
1978 1979 1980 
Total 22.8 31.3 36.1 37.5 37.8 3". 1 3-9 0.8 -1.9 Industrialized Countries 16.1 23.2 22.8 22.6 21.6 23.7 -0.9 8.9 4.5 Developing Countries (b) 1.0 2.3 1.8 6.1 4.0 2.9 27.1 -34.4 -27.5 
(Oil Exporters) ( - ) t-) (0.1) (0.1) ( - ) : - ) ( - ) 
Centrally Planned 
Economies 0.1 0.1 0.3 _ - - - - -Other 5.6 8.7 8.2 8.8 9.2 8.5 7.3 4.5 -7.6 
Source: World Bank. 
(a) Preliminary estimate. 
(b) Note that the World Bank includes the Mediterranean region of Europe in this group. 
Table 14 
WEIGHTED SPREADS ON VARIABLE INTEREST 
EUROCURRENCY CREDITS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES(a) 
(Percentages) 
Spreads 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(a) 
Op to 0.500 _ _ 1.3 10.6 16.5 
0.501 - 0.750 - - 0.2 14.9 42.1 40.6 
0.751 - 1 000 - - 18.8 30.5 26.9 22.6 
1 001 - 1 250 1.9 8.2 13-7 21.7 13-3 10.4 
1 251 - 1 500 35.8 26.4 15.4 16.9 4.0 7.0 
1 501 - 1 750 36.1 29.9 32.2 6.7 1.9 1.7 
1 751 - 2 000 23.0 27.6 14.0 5.3 0.8 0.6 
2 001 - 2 250 2.6 6.5 3.0 1.7 0.1 0.1 
2 251 - and over 0.2 1.2 2.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 Not known 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: World Bank. 
(a) Note that the World Bank includes the Mediterranean region of Europe in this classification. 
(b) Preliminary estimates. 
Table 15 
ORIGINAL MATURITIES ON EUROCURRENCY CREDITS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES(a) 
(Percentage distribution) 
Original maturity (years) 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(b) 
Over 1 - 3.00 5.7 2.3 3.9 2.9 5.3 6.5 3.01 - 5.00 62.9 53.5 19.5 4.9 4.2 3.5 
5.01 - 7.00 24.1 30.7 64.0 27.2 7.7 20.8 
7.01 - 10.00 3.3 4.7 8.6 56.0 59.9 62.7 
10.01 - 15.00 1.7 - - 6.4 17.4 4.4 
15.01 - 20.00 - - - 0.3 0.2 
20.01 - 25.00 - - - - - -
25.01 and over - - - - - -
Not known 2.2 8.9 4.0 2.5 5.2 1.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: World Bank. 
(a) Note that the World Bank Includes the Mediterranean region of Europe in this category. 
(b) Preliminary estimates. 
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Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS(a) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(b) 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(billions of dollars at 1970 prices) 189 202 215 232 249 257 270 283 296 31» 332 
Population (millions of inhabitants; 266 273 280 288 295 303 311 319 327 335 343 Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 710 738 766 807 844 849 870 889 907 939 967 Growth rates 
Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 6.9 6.6 6.6 8.1 7.3 3.3 5.0 4.8 4.7 6.0 5.7 
Per capita gross domestic product 4.1 3-9 3-8 5.3 4.6 0.7 2.4 2.2 2.1 3.4 3.1 
Gross income 7.2 6.4 6.8 9.2 9.0 1.8 5.1 4.9 4.1 6.8 5.9 
Terms of trade 3-3 -2.6 3.5 12.4 14.8 - 12.2 1.6 3.9 -9-9 4.6 3.3 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 9.0 4.7 15.4 38.8 52.3 -4.8 14.3 17.6 10.9 32.1 21.3 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 14.4 10.4 12.6 28.5 62.2 9.0 4.3 14.3 16.6 26.0 25.5 Consumer prices (c) 12.2 13-5 20.9 36.3 40.0 57.6 61.5 40.4 38.7 53.8 56.2 
Millions of dollars 
External sector 
Balance on trade in goods and services -523 -1 618 -1 282 607 -2 049 -8 696 -4 736 -3 783 -7 915 -6 063 -10 180 Oil-exporting countries 135 363 129 1 191 5 298 -1 456 -1 620 -3 358 -5 651 431 3 395 
Non-oil-exporting countries -658 -1 981 -1 411 -584 -7 347 -7 240 -3 116 -425 -2 264 -6 494 -13 575 Balance on current account -3 356 -4 751 -4 452 -3 652 -7 099 -14 201 -11 439 •11 834 -17 849 -19 346 -27 430 Oil-exporting countries (d) -1 243 -1 234 -1 345 -930 2 630 -3 575 -4 289 -6 365 -9 577 -5 087 -3 750 Non-oil-exporting countries -2 113 -3 517 -3 107 -2 722 -9 729 -10 626 -7 150 -5 469 -8 272 -14 259 -23 680 Overall balance of payments 1 558 497 2 830 4 047 3 704 964 2 660 5 012 5 545 6 651 -1 520 Oil-exporting countries 459 576 538 913 5 478 2 769 -735 • 751 -1 827 2 868 2 180 Non-oil-exporting countries 1 099 -79 2 292 3 134 -1 774 -1 805 3 395 4 261 7 372 3 783 -3 700 Public and State-guaranteed 
external debt 16 077 18 279 21 488 27 438 36 61 1 44 594 57 871 72 548 94 523 111 344 125 000 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) The figures for the product, population and income correspond to the set of 21 countries given 
in table 17, excluding Jamaica and Cuba. Those for the external sector and prices refer to the 
set of 23 countries given in table 23. 
(b) Preliminary figures. 
(c) Variation from December to December, calculated by weighting the changes in the consumer price 
indexes of each country by the respective population in each year. 
N> (d) In contrast with previous issues of the Economic Survey, in wich Mexico and Peru appeared 
as non-oil-exporting countries, these two nations have been classified in this issue among 
the group of oil-exporting countries. 
Table 33 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates) 
1970-1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(a) 
Argentina 4.1 -0.9 -0.2 6.0 -3.9 6.8 1.1 Bolivia 5.8 5.1 6.8 3-4 2.8 1.4 1.0 Brazil 11.5 5.7 9.0 4.7 6.0 6.4 8.0 Colombia 6.9 4.3 4.2 4.8 8.6 5.1 4.1 Costa Rica 7.1 2.1 5.5 8.9 5.7 4.3 1.7 Cuba (b) 8.7(c) 12.3 3.5 3.1 8.2 1.9 1.4 Chile 2.6 -14.4 3.8 9.7 8.3 8.2 6.5 Ecuador 8.6 6.8 9.3 7.5 5.4 5.4 5.3 El Salvador 4.9 5.6 4.0 5.9 4.4 -1.6 -9.9 Guatemala 6.4 1.9 7.4 7.8 5.0 4.5 3.4 Haiti 4.7 2.2 5.3 1.3 4.4 4.7 5.2 Honduras 3.5 -2.0 7.0 5.8 7.9 6.8 1.3 Jamaica 4.9 -2.6 -8.3 -2.0 -1.7 -2.0 Mexico 6.2 4.1 2.1 3-3 7.3 8.0 7Ì4 Nicaragua 5.3 2.2 5.0 6.3 -7.2 -24.8 10.7 Panama 5.2 0.6 -1.1 1.6 4.1 5.7 4.9 Paraguay 6.4 6.3 7.0 12.8 10.8 10.7 11.0 Peru 4.8 4.5 2.0 -0.1 -0.7- 3.4 3.1 Dominican Republic 10.1 5.2 6.7 5.5 2.3 4.8 5.2 Uruguay 1.3 4.8 4.2 1.8 6.2 8.7 4.5 Venezuela 5.2 5.9 8.4 6.8 3.1 0.7 1.6 Total (d) 7.1 3.3 5.0 4.8 4.7 6.0 5.7 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Preliminary estimates, subject to revision. 
(b) Growth rates refer to the material product, which is the sum of the value of gross output of 
the agricultural, mining, manufacturing, construction and electricity sectors. 
(e) 1971-1971. 
(d) Excluding Cuba and Jamaica. 
feble 18 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET PRICES 
Dollars at 1970 prices Annual growth rates 




1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
(a) 
Argentina 1 273 1 368 1 410 2.7 -2.2 -1.5 4.7 -5.1 5.5 -0.2 Bolivia 317 370 378 3.2 2.4 4.2 0.8 0.2 -1.2 -1.6 Brazil 528 777 956 8.6 3.1 6.3 2.1 3.5 3.9 5.5 Colombia 587 708 831 4.3 1.6 2.4 2.6 6.6 2.9 1.9 Costa Rica 740 875 996 4.4 -0.3 3.0 6.3 3.8 0.8 -0.6 Chile 952 821 1 071 0.8 -15.8 2.0 7.8 6.5 6.4 4.7 Ecuador 415 542 640 5.7 3.7 6.0 4.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 El Salvador 422 476 431 1.8 2.5 1.0 2.8 M -4.5 -10.0 Guatemala 439 494 558 3.1 -1.1 4.1 4.6 1.9 1.3 0.4 Haiti 123 135 148 2.4 -0.1 2.8 -1.0 2.2 2.4 2.8 
Honduras 313 296 338 0.5 -4.9 4.7 4.9 3.3 3.0 -2.2 Mexico 921 1 032 1 167 2.8 0.9 -0.9 0.2 4.1 4.9 4.3 Nicaragua 431 480 349 2.1 -1.1 1.7 2.8 -10.2 -27.5 7.1 
Panama 940 1 043 1 150 2.4 -2.0 -3.5 -0.8 1.7 3.2 2.5 Paraguay 383 452 630 3.2 2.9 3.6 9.1 7.2 7.1 7.5 
Pert 646 707 666 2.0 1.8 -0.7 -2.7 -3.3 0.6 0.3 Dominican Republic 378 503 561 6.9 2.3 3.9 2.8 -0.4 2.2 2.6 Uruguay 1 091 1 159 1 442 0.6 4.5 3.8 1.3 5.6 7.9 3.9 Venezuela 1 205 1 278 1 312 1.7 2.2 4.6 3.1 -0.4 -2.7 -1.8 Total 710 849 967 4.3 0.7 2.4 2.2 2.1 3.4 3.1 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data, 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
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Table 33 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
(Annual growth rates)(a) 
1970-
1971 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
(b) 
Total supply 7.1 2.8 1.5 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.3 Gross domestic product 7.1 3.3 5.0 - o TTT ITo 5.7 Imports of goods and services 10.8 - -0.1 8.0 9.9 10.7 11.9 Total demand 7.4 2.8 4.5 5.1 5.2 6.4 6.3 Domestic demand 7.7 3-3 4.2 1.7 4.6 6.0 6.5 Gross fixed investment 8.9 9.2 4.1 1.1 6.2 5.3 8.1 Total consumption (c) 7.4 1.8 1.2 1.9 1.1 6.2 5.9 Exports of goods and services 1.1 - 8.7 9.1 12.8 10.2 5.1 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Calculated on the basis of constant values at 1970 prices. 
(b) Preliminary figures. 
(c) Including changes in stocks. 
Table 20 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATIVE SHARES OF EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS AND 







1970 80.5 19.7 9.1 9.3 
1971 80.5 20.0 8.6 9.1 1972 80.1 20.3 8.7 9.1 
1973 79.9 20.7 8.9 9-5 
1971 81.2 21.3 8.3 10.8 
1975 80.0 22.5 7.8 10.3 
1976 79.2 22.1 8.1 9.7 
1977 79.1 22.2 8.1 10.0 
1978 79.0 22.5 9.0 10.5 
1979 79.2 22.1 9.1 11.0 
1980(b) 79.4 22.9 9.3 11.7 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Includes changes in stocks. 
(b) Preliminary figures. 
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Table 33 
LATIN AHERICA: VARIATIONS IN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS 
(Growth rates) 
Exports Imports 
Value Volume Unit Value Volume Unit 
value value 
Latin America 
1970 9.1 1.1 7.9 14.3 9.6 4.4 
1971 3.1 0.9 2.1 11.1 5.9 5.0 
1972 15.9 6.3 9.1 13.9 8.1 5.4 
1973 42.7 8.1 32.0 31.1 11.8 17.3 1974 57.7 -1.0 59.3 69.4 22.0 38.9 1975 -7.1 -3-7 -3.6 8.0 -1.6 9.8 
1976 15.2 8.1 6.6 3.3 -1.6 4.9 
1977 18.7 7.3 10.7 13.9 6.9 6.5 1978 7.9 12.0 -3.7 13.3 5.9 7.0 
1979 34.3 11.0 21.0 26.9 9.7 15.7 1980(a) 29.0 5.4 22.3 31.5 11.0 18.4 
Oil exporting countries 
1970 8.0 5.0 2.9 10.2 5.3 4.7 1971 15.4 -1.8 17.6 13.6 8.9 4.3 
1972 4.7 -0.1 4.8 13.8 7.4 5.9 
1973 49.8 8.2 38.5 17.6 0.7 16.9 1974 134.6 -8.4 156.2 54.2 26.7 21.7 
1975 -18.3 (b) -21.4 (b) 4.1 (b) 36.8 <b) 18.9 (b) 15.1 (b> 1976 8.2 9.4 5.1 4.2 3.0 5.0 27.1 7.8 17.8 1.6 7.9 6.1 1977 4.5 11.9 -8.5 5.8 14.2 5.8 34.5 18.6 21.8 9.4 10.4 8.4 1978 -2.1 9.3 1.4 16.6 -3.5 -6.3 13.0 15.8 3.9 7.1 8.8 8.2 
1979 49.8 51.4 3.9 12.0 44.1 35.2 1.4 18.8 -6.6 8.8 8.6 9.2 1980(a) 30.3 41.3 -14.1 4.2 51.7 35.6 10.1 30.6 -1.5 16.1 11.7 12.4 
Non-oil-exporting countries 
1970 9.4 - 9.4 15.3 10.5 4.3 1971 -0.6 1.7 -2-3 10.6 5.2 5.1 1972 19.8 8.1 10.8 14.0 8.3 5.3 1973 40.6 8.1 30.0 34.0 14.2 17.4 
1974 33.3 0.9 32.1 72.3 21.1 42.3 
1975 -1.0 (c) 0.6 (c) -1.5 (c) 3.1 (c) -5.7 (c) 9.4 (c) 1976 18.4 19.7 8.6 9.8 9.0 9.0 -2.1 0.4 -6.5 -4.3 4.7 4.6 
1977 24.7 23.5 10.1 7.9 13.3 14.4 7.8 10.6 2.1 4.8 5.6 5.5 1978 11.4 7.0 13.6 10.2 -1.9 -2.9 13.4 11.4 6.7 4.9 6.3 6.2 
1979 29.5 23.0 11.9 10.6 15.7 11.3 36.2 33.2 15.8 10.5 17.6 20.5 
1980(a) 28.5 19.0 7.8 5.9 19.2 12.3 37.3 32.1 14.8 6.7 19.6 23.8 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) From 1976 onwards, includes Mexico and Peru. 
(c) From 1976 onwards, excludes Mexico and Peru. 
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Table 33 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 
(Growth rates) 
Value Volme Unit value 





























Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data, (a) Preliminary figures. 




1978 1979 1980 
(a) 
-3.7 21.0 22.3 0.9 16.1 8.8 
-6.3 35.2 35TF 1.0 3577 25.7 
TÛÏ T O 33.0 -1ÏÏ75 " 7 3 11.5 
-6.9 45.7 24.0 4.0 23-3 2.9 4.2 26.5 40.0 29.6 30.9 51.2 -4.8 48.7 23.2 3.6 53.5 -1.6 
1.7 31.6 60.0 -1.6 • 18.2 39.9 -3.8 45.7 60.0 -13.8 44.9 16.1 
-2.9 11.3 12.3 1.7 1.1 -3.9 
3.8 21.0 19.0 10.5 -3-3 -12.6 5.0 12.0 31.0 15.2 3.2 19.7 -7.0 9.1 7.9 -2.5 0.4 -2.6 
-14.5 -5.0 4.0 7.7 12.8 -5.8 -5.4 4.7 -0.2 1.4 -5.6 -9.6 
4.9 30.9 14.0 4.0 27.6 4.1 
-15.0 7.0 2.0 -17.2 17.6 -19.4 1.2 1.6 13.6 -11.8 -5.6 2.8 
11.2 2.0 51.0 8.6 -11.3 6.5 
3.1 2.0 12.0 6.9 -21.9 -5.6 
1.3 -6.3 14.9 12.5 11.6 -5.4 2.0 7.8 34.0 -2-3 -7.7 -3.7 -4.9 -4.5 14.2 -7.8 -23-3 -35.9 1.1 31.8 19.0 -3.1 -6.2 -5.8 
-8.9 6.8 4.0 1.9 -7.6 -13.3 -3.0 14.6 46.0 -19.9 16.2 -8.5 6.4 31.9 22.0 9.0 -6.9 -0.8 
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Table 33 
LATIN AHERICA: EVOLUTION OF IMPORTS OF GOODS 
(Growth rates) 
Value Volume Unit value 
1978 1979 1980 1978 1979 1980 1978 1979 1980 
(a) (a) (a) 
Latin America 13.3 26.9 31.5 5.9 9.7 11.0 7.0 15.7 18.4 
Oil-exporting countries 15.8 W J 30.6 7.1 "STff T O "O 9.2 T O 
Bolivia 22.7 17.8 -11.9 11.6 -1.3 -21.4 10.0 19.4 12.0 
Ecuador 25.3 23.1 12.5 19.4 6.9 0.5 4.9 15.1 12.0 
Mexico 38.5 49.4 53.5 28.3 33-7 33.5 8.0 11.8 15.0 
Peru -26.1 21.9 55.8 -31.6 4.2 37.9 8.0 17.0 13.0 
Trinidad and Tobago 19.6 6.9. 27.0 8.6 -0.7 13.3 10.1 7.8 12.0 
Venezuela 10.2 -3-5 9.7 0.2 -10.5 -2.0 10.0 7.8 12.0 
Non-oll-exporting countries 11.4 33.2 32.1 4.9 10.5 6.7 6.2 20.5 23.8 Argentina -8.2 73TS TO" -10.5 3775 3T5 TjS 2572 T7.0 
Barbados 11.9 31.6 29.3 8.4 11.5 13.4 6.0 15.1 14.0 
Brazil 13.2 31.9 27.9 5.8 8.1 -5.5 7.0 22.0 35.4 
Colombia 39.1 18.0 36.1 27.6 1.5 19.4 9.0 12.9 14.9 
Costa Rica 13.5 21.2 5.4 7.1 6.3 -11.4 5.9 14.0 19.0 
Chile 41.0 45.2 27.3 30.5 18.9 7.9 8.0 22.0 18.0 
El Salvador 10.6 0.2 -5.8 5.4 -12.0 -20.1 5.0 14.0 18.0 
Guatemala 18.1 9.4 6.3 10.3 -7.4 -12.2 7.1 18.0 21.0 
Guyana -11.6 16.5 41.9 -15.8 5.2 12.6 5.0 10.9 26.0 
Haiti 6.3 7.5 21.7 -0.6 -3.6 -1.0 7.0 11.6 23.0 
Honduras 19.0 19.1 22.0 13.4 10.9 4.2 4.9 7.3 17.0 
Jamaica 12.5 17.7 11.0 5.1 6.0 -11.9 7.0 11.1 26.0 
Nicaragua -21.1 -41.0 142.3 -28.6 -48.6 95.4 10.0 14.6 24.0 
Panama 8.8 28.2 26.7 2.7 6.1 2.2 6.0 20.8 24.0 
Paraguay 19.9 33.6 12.7 16.6 12.4 -3.7 2.9 18.8 17.0 
Dominican Republic 1.1 27.2 38.0 -6.1 15.1 14.1 8.0 10.5 21.0 
Uruguay 4.4 58.6 32.3 1.4 28.6 0.3 3.0 23.3 32.0 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data, 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
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Table 33 
OIL-IMPORTING COUNTRIES: IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS(a) 
Millions of dollars CIF Percentage of total imports 
1970 1973 1974 1978 1979 1980 1970 1973 1974 1978 1979 1980 
Argentina 59 116 385 247 818 654 3.5 5.2 10.5 6.4 12.2 6.2 Barbados 6 11 31 ' 61 102 130 5.1 6.5 15.2 19.5 24.1 23.6 
41.3 Brazil 286 984 3 226 4 631 6 932 10 394 10.0 14.1 22.8 30.8 35.0 Colombia 9 " 4 4 374 665 394 1.1 0.4 0.3 12.8 19.8 9.8 Costa Rica 12 30 63 116 ' 185 165 3.8 6.6 8.8 9.8 13.0 14.1 
17.8 Chile 54 69 246 479 889 960 5.8 6.3 12.9 16.0 21.1 El Salvador 5 . 21 52 80 123(b) 159(c) 2.3 5.6 9-3 7.8 11.9 16.3 Guatemala 16 30 92 168 234 322 5.4 7.0 13-1 13.1 15.6 19.9 Guyana 11 22 45 65 76 102 8.2 12.6 17.7 23.3 23.6 26.8 Haiti 3 4 12 37 41 51 5.6 4.8 9.6 17.5 17.6 18.0 Honduras 15 26 63 74 113 170(d) 6.8 9.9 16.1 10.6 13.6 16.8 Jamaica 33 71 194 213 259 280 6.3 10.7 20.7 23.2 25.6 25.0 Nicaragua 12 24 61 89 75 174(d) 6.1 7.3 10.9 14.9 18.6 19.8 Panama 66 89 274 228 330(c) 421(c) 18.5 18.2 34.3 24.2 27.8 28.0 Paraguay 11 13 50 84 105 156 14.4 10.7 25.3 21.9 20.2 26.4 Dominican 
Republic 19 48 116 194 279 398 6.2 9.8 15.0 19.0 22.5 23-2 Uruguay 33 48 151 218 302 455 14.2 16.1 30.3 28.2 25.0 2 8.4 Total 660 1 610 5 065 7 358 11 526 15 385 6.9 10.2 18.1 21.4 25.4 26.3 
Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1970 to 1978. 
(a) The series covers items corresponding to Division 33 of the SITC (Rev. 1) and therefore 
excludes natural gas (Division 34). ' 
(b) Central American Monetary Council, Centroamerlca, Balance dejiagos, 1979. 
(c) Figures estimated on the basis of the growth in oil imports~ 
(d) CEPAL, on the basi3 of official data. 
Table 25 









1970 100.0 6.5 100.0 3.1 1971 98.2 -1.8 110.6 10.6 1972 108.1 10.1 109.4 -1.1 1973 131.3 21.5 140.2 28.2 
1974 149.1 13.6 270.3 192.8 





107.6 13.7 128.9 19.8 
120.7 -6.4 
109.4 (b) -9.4 (b) 
123.6 124.5 13.0 14.2 146.1 145.8 18.2 17.1 .153-0 148.3 4.7 1.7 168.5 150.0 10.1 1.1 
181.0 144.2 7.4 -3.9 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) From 1976 onwards, includes Mexico and Peru. 
(b) From 1976 onwards, excludes Mexico and Peru. (c) Preliminary information. 
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Table 33 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE 
(1970=100) 
Latin America Oil-exporting countries Non-oil-exporting countries 
Index Percentage Index Percentage Index Percentage 
variation variation variation 
1970 100.0 3.3 100.0 -1.7 100.0 1.9 
1971 97.3 -2.7 112.7 12.7 93.0 -7.0 
1972 100.7 3.5 111.5 -1.1 97.9 5.3 1973 1 1 3 . 2 12.1 132 . 1 18.5 108.1 10.7 
1971 129.9 11.8 278.1 110.5 100.6 -7.2 
1975 111.1 -12.2 251.6 (a) -9.5 (a) 90.6 (b) -9.9 (b) 1976 115.9 1.6 210.0 179.1 -1.6 - 1 . 1 9I.3 89.6 1.1 3.1 
1977 120.1 3.9 218.3 175.0 3.5 -2.3 101.2 97.2 7.3 8.5 1978 108.1 -9.9 220.3 151.6 -11.3 -13.1 93.3 89.8 -7.8 -7.6 
1979 113.1 1.6 292.1 187.7 32.7 23.8 91.8 82.1 -1.6 -8.6 
1980(c) 117.1 3.3 397.0 226.1 35.8 20.6 91.1 71.5 -0.1 -9.3 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) From 1976 onwards, includes Mexico and Peru. 
(b) From 1976 onwards, excludes Mexico and Peru. 
(c) Preliminary information. 
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Table 27 
LATI» AMERICA: TRADE BALANCE 
(Millions of dollars) 
Exports of goods, FOB Imports of goods, FOB Balance on trade in goods Balance on services(b) Trade balance 
1978 1979 1980(a) 1978 1979 1980(a) 1978 1979 1980(a) 1978 1979 1980(a) 1978 1979 1980(a) 
Latin America 52 855 70 964 91 260 55 772 70 437 92 272 -2 917 527 -1 010 -4 998 -6 590 -9 165 -7 915 -6 063 -10 175 
Oil-exporting countries 20 904 31 658 44 690 24 1Ö3 28 590 37 420 -3 279 3 06ff 7 270 -2 372 -2 637 -3 875 -5 651 431 3 395 
Bolivia 640 777 970 790 931 820 -150 -154 150 -148 -183 -225 -298 -337 -75 
Ecuador 1 529 2 171 2 500 1 704 2 097 2 360 -175 74 140 -312 -326 -370 -487 -252 -230 
Mexico 6 443 9 416 16 380 7 786 11 632 17 860 -1 343 -2 216 -1 480 1 333 1 306 730 -10 -910 -750 
Peru 1 933 3 474 3 860 1 600 1 951 3 040 333 1 523 820 -11 33 -195 322 1 556 625 
Trinidad and Tobago 1 273 1 621 2 540 1 068 1 142 1 450 205 479 1 090 -16 -101 -140 189 378 950 
Venezuela 9 086 14 199 18 440 11 235 10 837 11 890 -2 149 3 362 6 550 -3 218 -3 366 -3 675 -5 367 -4 2 875 
Mon-oil-exporting countries 31 951 39 306 46 570 31 589 41 847 54 850 362 -2 541 -8 280 -2 626 -3 953 -5 290 -2 264 -6 494 -13 570 
Argentina 6 405 7 818 Ô 000 3 482 è 044 9 450 2 923 1 774 -1 450 -446 -1 377 -2 000 2 477 397 -3 450 
Barbados 111 132 180 288 379 490 -177 -247 -310 162 217 235 -15 -30 -75 
Brazil 12 450 15 235 20 130 13 607 17 942 22 960 -1 157 -2 707 -2 830 -1 719 -2 318 -2 720 -2 875 -5 025 -5 550 
Colombia 3 188 4 062 4 360 2 753 3 248 4 420 435 814 -60 -106 -99 -130 329 715 -190 
Costa Rica 864 930 1 000 1 049 1 271 1 340 -185 -341 -340 -84 -110 -105 -269 -451 -445 
Chile 2 460 3 835 4 710 2 886 4 190 5 330 -426 -355 -620 -243 -239 -315 -669 -594 -935 
El Salvador 847 1 135 1 080 953 955 900 -106 180 180 -128 -180 -175 -234 - 5 
Guatemala 1 098 1 222 1 520 1 282 1 402 1 490 -184 -180 30 -163 -139 -250 -347 -319 -220 
Guyana 296 293 390 254 296 420 42 -3 -30 -43 -81 -100 -1 -84 -130 
Haiti 158 138 160 214 230 280 -56 -92 -120 -41 -40 -40 -97 -132 -160 
Honduras 626 750 830 654 779 950 -28 -29 -120 -61 -72 -90 -89 -101 -210 
Jamaica 795 815 990 750 883 980 45 -68 10 22 48 -50 67 -20 -40 
Nicaragua 646 567 450 553 326 790 93 241 -340 -34 -67 -60 59 174 -400 
Panama 295 334 390 862 1 105 1 400 -567 -771 -1 010 409 520 600 -158 -251 -410 
Paraguay 350 384 390 432 577 650 -82 -193 -260 18 -5 -45 -64 -198 -305 
Dominican Republic 676 868 960 860 1 094 1 510 -184 -226 -550 -137 -83 -120 -321 -309 -670 
Uruguay 686 788 1 030 710 1 126 1 490 -24 -338 -460 -33 72 75 -57 -266 -385 
Source: 1978-1979, International Monetary Fund; 1980, CEPAL estimates on the basis of official data; 
" 1978-1980, Chile, Central Bank; 1979, Ecuador, Central Bank; 1979, El Salvador, Central American 
Moneraty Council; 1979, Guyana and Nicaragua, CEPAL estimates. 




LATIN AMERICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Trade balance Net payments of profits 
and Interest Balance on current account (b) Capital movements (c) Overall balance (d) 
1978 1979 1980(a) 1978 1979 1980(a) 1978 1979 1980(a) 1978 1979 1980(a) • 1978 1979 1980(a) 
Latin America -7 915 -6 063 -10 175 -10 303 -13 650 -17 730 -17 849 -19 346 -27 430 23 394 25 997 25 910 5 545 6 651 -1 520 Oil-exporting countries 
Bolivia 
-5 651 431 3 395 -3 742 -5 320 -6 980 -9 577 -5 087 -3 750 7 750 7 955 5 930 -1 827 2 868 2 180 -298 -337 -75 -114 -181 -240 -406 -506 -305 256 533 175 -150 27 -130 Ecuador -487 -252 -230 -255 -395 -580 -730 -647 -810 700 715 1 155 -30 68 345 Mexico -10 -910 -750 -2 784 -3 855 -5 380 -2 612 -4 561 -5 880 2 967 4 937 7 030 355 376 1 150 Peru 322 1 556 625 -576 -967 -830 -252 590 -200 251 455 1 080 -1 1 045 880 Trinidad and Tobago 189 378 950 -51 -45 -85 122 304 835 87 29 -195 209 333 640 Venezuela -5 367 -4 2 875 38 123 135 -5 699 -267 2 610 3 489 1 286 -3 315 -2 210 1 019 -705 Non-oil-exporting 
countries -2 264 -6 494 ' -13 570 -6 561 -8 330 -10 750 -8 272 -14 259 -23 680 15 644 18 042 19 980 7 372 3 783 -3 700 Argentina 2 477 397 -3 450 -677 -904 -1 500 1 848 -472 -4 900 110 4 756 2 230 1 958 4 284 -2 670 Barbados -15 -30 -75 -6 -11 ' -10 - -6 -24 -70 26 38 55 20 14 15 Brazil -2 875 -5 025 -5 550 -4 232 -5 459 -6 780 -7 038 -10 470 -12 240 10 996 7 536 8 960 3 958 -2 934 -3 280 Colombia 329 715 -190 -260 -243 ' -250 • -Î26 525 -350 404 972 1 500 530 1 497 1 150 Costa Rica -269 -451 -445 -109 -141 -185 -362 -574 -610 366 474 645 4 -100 35 Chile -669 -594 -935 -489 -675 -915 -1 088 -1 189 -1 785" •1 792 • 2 319 3 030 704 1 130 1 245 El Salvador -234 5 -65 -67 -85 -254 -30 -40 298 -98 -30 44 -128 -70 Guatemala -347 -319 -220 -32 -13 -45 -265 -209 -150 288 157 -100 23 -52 -250 Guyana -1 -84 -130 -21 -30 -35 -28 -119 -170 44 64 135 16 -55 -35 Haiti -97 -132 -160 -15 -14 -15 -82 -114 -135 85 131 125 3 17 -10 Honduras -89 -101 -210 -86 -115 -140 -170 -211 -340 167 234 265 -3 23 -75 Jamaica 67 -20 -40 -179 -202 -260 -97 -152 -250 41 -15 340 -56 -167 90 Nicaragua 59 174 -400 -94 -72 -40 -34 103 -440 -70 -90 270 -104 13 -170 Panama -158 -251 -410 -50 -80 -75 -242 -369 -525 316 349 545 74 -20 20 Paraguay -64 -198 -305 -61 -71 -90 -124 -266 -395 279 422 560 155 156 165 Dominican Republic -321 -309 -670 -108 -175 -230 -323 -366 -800 285 373 840 -38 7 40 Uruguay -57 -266 -385 -77 -58 -95 -133 -322 -480 217 420 580 84 98 100 
Source: 1978-1979. International ttonetary Fund; 1980, CEPAL estimates on the basis of official data; 
1978-1980, Chile, Central Bank; 1979, Ecuador, Central Bank; 1979, El Salvador, Central American 
Monetary Council; Guyana 1979 and Nicaragua 1979, CEPAL estimates. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Including net unrequited private transfer payments. 
(c) Including net errors and emissions and counterpart items. 
(d) Corresponds to variations in international reserves (- indicates reduction). 
Table 33 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT 
AND VALUE OF EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES(a) 
(Percentages) 



























Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
TaT Minus sign indicates a surplus on the balance of payments current account, 
(b) Preliminary estimate. 
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Table 33 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF GROSS INTERNATIONAL RESERVES(a) 
(minora of dollars) 
Balances at end of December Growth rates 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1976 1977 1978 1979 '1980 
Latin America 22 378 26 943 33 821 40 790 39 017 28.1 20.1 25.5 20.6 -4.3 Oil-exporting countries 11 213 12 057 10 878 13 876 16 064 -1.2 "7.2 -9.8 27.6 
Bolivia 151 211 170 178 106 8.3 39.7 -19.4 4.7 -40.4 
Ecuador 477 623 636 722 1 013 88.5 30.6 2.1 13.5 40.3 Mexico 1 188 1 649 1 842 2 033 3 183(b) -11.1 38.8 11.7 10.4 56.6 
Peru 289 357 390 1 521 2 401(b) -32.2 23.5 9.2 290.0 57.9 
Trinidad and Tobago 1 014 1 482 1 805 2 138 2 780 35.0 46.2 21.8 18.4 30.0 
Venezuela 8 124 7 735 6 035 7 284 6 581 -3.3 -4.8 -22.0 20.7 -9.7 
Non-oil-exporting 
countries 11 135 14 886 22 943 26 914 22 953 83.1 33.7 54.1 17.3 -14.7 Argentina 1 M5 3 154 4 966 9 388 6 719 101.7 118.3 57.5 89.0 -28.4 
Barbados 28 37 60 66 79 -30.0 32.1 62.2 10.0 19.7 
Brazil 6 488 7 192 11 826 8 966 5 686(b) 63.0 10.9 64.4 -24.2 -36.6 Colombia 1 101 1 747 2 366 3 844 4 831 131.8 58.7 35.4 62.5 25.7 
Costa Rica 95 190 194 119 151 93.9 100.0 2.1 -38.7 29.4 
Chile 405 127 1 090 1 938 3 123 623.2 5.4 155.3 77.8 61.1 El Salvador 185 211 268 140 78 72.9 14.1 27.0 -47.8 -44.3 
Guatemala 491 669 712 696 115 72.9 36.3 10.9 -6.2 -36.1 
Guyana 28 23 58 18 13 -73.0 -17.9 152.2 -69.0 -27.8 Haiti 28 31 39 55 16 133-3 21.1 14.7 41.0 -70.9 
Honduras 131 180 181 209 150 35.1 37.1 2.2 13.6 -28.2 
Jamaica 32 18 59 63 105 -74.6 50.0 22.9 6.8 66.7 Nicaragua 146 148 51 64 • • • 19.7 1.4 -65.5 25.5 ... 
Panama 79 71 150 119 117 132.3 -10.1 111.3 -20.7 -1.7 
Paraguay 158 268 149 609 762 37.1 69.6 67.5 35.6 25.1 
Dominican Republic 121 180 154 239 202 9.7 15.2 -14.4 55.2 -15.5 
Uruguay 171 307 287 381 173 131.2 79.5 -6.5 32.8 24.1 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, April 1981. 
(a) Excluding gold. 
(b) CEFAL estimates on the basis of official data. 
Table 31 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT(a) 
(Billions of dollars) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(b) 
Public and State-guaranteed 
external debt 16.1 18.3 21.5 27.4 36.6 44.6 57.9 72.5 94.5 111.3 125.0 Non-guaranteed bank debt • • • • « • ... ... 18.8 25.2 32.6 34.6 39.4 54.3 70.0 Gross total debt(c) ... • • • ... ... 55.9 70.7 92.4 109.0 135.3 167.2 195.0 
Gross international 
reserves (d) 1.3 5.2 8.6 13.0 17.0 17.4 22.4 26.9 33.8 40.8 39.0 Net total debt ... ... ... ... 38.9 53.3 70.0 82.7 101.5 126.4 156.0 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 15 November 1980. Bank for International Settlements, 
Annual Report, June 19*80; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
April 1981, and CEPAL estimates. 
(a) Outstanding effectively disbursed debt. 
(b) Preliminary estimate, subject to revision. 
(c) Including debt with IMF. 
(d) Excluding gold. 
3 6 
Table 33 
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN CONSUMER PRICES 
(Variations December to December) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1971 1975 
Latin America(a) n .2_ l i 20 •1 3L J3. 10. l i 57 •A Countries with high 
inflation 11 .1 15 .6 21 .1 11. .5 11 .9 69 .3 Argentina ZUE 39, .1 OT72 "Ì3T9 40 .1 331 .9 Brazil 17 .7 18, .1 11 .0 13. 7 33 .8 31 .2 Colombia 3 .5 11, .1 11 .0 25. .0 26 .9 17 .9 Chile 31 .9 22 .1 163 .1 508. 1 375 .9 310 .7 Mexico 7 .8 -0, .8 5 .6 21. .3 20 .6 11 .3 Peru 5 .7 7, .7 1 .3 13. ,8 19 .2 21 .0 Uruguay 19 .3 35, .6 91 .7 77. .5 107 .2 66 .8 Countries with 
moderate inflation 2 .8 1 , .6 7 .2 15. ,0 19, .8 10, .2 Barbados 9 .2 10, .1 1ÖT¥ 1E7Ö 3575 12 .3 Bolivia 3 .8 3. .3 23 .6 31. ,8 39 .0 6, .0 Costa Rica 1 .3 1, .9 6 .9 15. ,9 30 .6 20 .5 Ecuador 8 .0 6, .8 6 .9 20. 6 21, .2 13 .2 El Salvador 1 .0 - 0 , .6 5 .2 7. 9 21, .0 15, .1 Guatemala 1 .0 0, .3 1 .1 17. 5 27. .5 0 , .8 Guyana 2 .1 1, .1 7 .1 15. 2 11, .6 5, .5 Haiti - 0 .7 13. .3 7 .3 20. 8 19. .5 19, .9 Honduras 1 .1 1. .5 6 .8 5. 1 13. .0 7. .8 Jamaica 7 .5 5, .2 9 .3 9. 6 20, .6 15, .7 Nicaragua 1, .9 Panama 2 .5 1, .0 6 .7 9. 7 16, .7 1 .1 Paraguay 2 .3 6, .3 9 .5 11. ,1 22 .0 8, .7 Dominican Republic - 1 .3 10, .6 8 .0 17. 2 10. .5 16, .5 Trinidad and Tobago 3 .3 5. .0 8 .0 21. 1 18, .6 13 .1 Venezuela 3 .1 3 .0 3 .5 5. ,1 11 .6 8 .0 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
71.8 
3 W 3 



























































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, April 1981 and official data supplied by the countrielH " " 
(a) The totals for Latin America and the subtotals for the groups of countries correspond to the 
mean variations for the countries, weighted by the respective populations. 
(b) Corresponds to the variation in consumer prices for the whole country. 
(c) Variation between June 1979 and June 1980. 
(d) Variation between September 1979 and September 198O. 
(e) Variation between November 1979 and November 1980. 
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Table 33 
LATIN AMERICA: PRICES OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF GOODS 
(Growth rates) 
Imports Exports 



























Trinidad and Tobago 
Venezuela 
11.1 M M M JÜLI JJLì Mîi z M 7J. 9̂ 0 -3J. 2U0 22.3 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
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